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STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES:
IN SEARCH OF...
STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO
INTEREST RATE SWAP AGREEMENTS
JEANETTE REDMOND*
INTRODUCTION
The Eastern Municipal Water District in Riverside County, Califor-
nia, entered into an interest rate swap agreement in connection with a
bond refunding, saving the water district nearly $2 million.' Florida's
Dade County entered into an interest rate swap agreement in connec-
tion with a financing arrangement for fifty-nine municipal projects and
saved the county $6 million.2 The State of New Jersey executed a $1
billion interest rate swap agreement in connection with the issuance of
notes and lowered its cost of raising capital from 3.10% to 2.69%, sav-
ing the state nearly $3 million in interest costs.3
An interest rate swap agreement ("IRSA") is one of a variety of
financial instruments generically referred to as a "derivative."4 A de-
rivative is typically described as a financial product that derives its
value from an underlying security, asset or index.5 An IRSA is a tech-
* I wish to thank Thomas L. Amenta and Steven F. Bracy, Esq., for reading an
initial draft of this Note and to express my sincere gratitude to Michael A. Vaccari,
Esq., for his guidance throughout the development of this Note.
1. Interest-Rate Swap Saves Water District $2 Million, Cal. Pub. Fin. (Bond Buyer
Newsl. on Mun. Fin. in the Golden State), Aug. 2, 1993, at 1, 3.
2. Interest Rate Swap Saves County Cash, ENR, Feb. 28, 1994, at 16.
3. Sean Monsarrat & Steven Dickson, New Jersey Does $1 Billion Swap, a Market
Record, Secondary Mixed, Bond Buyer, Sept. 24, 1992, at 1.
4. Fbr a detailed discussion of IRSAs' technical aspects, see Ravi E. Dattatreya
et al., Interest Rate & Currency Swaps: The Markets, Products and Applications
(1994).
This Note addresses IRSAs in particular as a means of focussing in a concrete man-
ner on the proposition that state legislatures should grant certain governmental units
express authorization to use modem financial tools when doing so enables govern-
mental units to reduce risks and costs. There are, however, a variety of other financial
instruments that also may be appropriate for use by governmental units to achieve
these goals. While this Note does not specifically investigate the legal issues, benefits
and risks of other forms of derivatives as they may apply to governmental units, the
guidelines and recommendations contained herein with respect to IRSAs may be ap-
plicable in other cases.
5. Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Fail-
ure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 Yale LJ. 1457, 1464-65 (1993)
(reviewing Peter L. Bernstein, Capital Ideas: The Improbable Origins of Modem
Wall Street (1992)).
There is no consensus on exactly what types of instruments the term "derivatives"
includes. For example, R. Fenn Putman, chairman of the Public Securities Associa-
tion, believes that the term derivatives should apply "only to interest rate swaps, caps,
floors, options, and other products whose value is derived from an underlying secunty
through a contract[, but not to] inverse floaters, [which] he maintains, are securities
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nique that allows two parties to "swap" future interest payments.6 A
simple IRSA 7 is a contract between two parties (often referred to as
"counterparties") 8 to exchange a series of payments.' The payments
are determined based on an agreed-upon dollar value and an agreed-
upon interest rate or method of determining the interest rate.' The
agreed-upon dollar value is referred to as the "notional" value of the
swap." In an IRSA no principal ever changes hands.'2
Since the early 1980s, the volume of these transactions has in-
creased phenomenally. In 1982, the outstanding notional value 13 of
IRSAs worldwide was approximately $3 billion. 4 By the end of 1993,
the aggregate notional value of outstanding IRSAs was estimated to
be over $6 trillion.'5 The bulk of this growth is attributable to private
with adjusted cash flows, not derivatives." Aaron Pressman & Lynn S. Hume, Regula-
tors, Market Wonder: Would Derivatives, By Any Other Name, Appear as Risky as
Feared?, Bond Buyer, May 4, 1994, at 6. In an inverse floater, "ownership of the
bonds is divided between primary investors and residual investors. The primary in-
vestor may receive a floating-rate .... The inverse floater investor receives the re-
mainder of the interest on the underlying bonds, after expenses of the arrangement
have been paid . . . ." George G. Wolf et al., Certain Legal Aspects of Secondary
Market Municipal Derivative Products, 49 Bus. Law. 1629, 1630 (1994).
6. Cyrus Ardalan, Forward to Inside the Swap Market 7, 10 (3d ed. 1988).
7. Typically, IRSAs are only one part of a larger, complex financing package. See
David Watts, The Structure and Mechanics of Interest Rate and Currency Swaps, in
Inside the Swap Market 19, 19 (3d ed. 1988).
8. The Beauty in the Beast, Economist, May 14, 1994, at 21.
9. See, e.g., Thomas A. McGavin, Jr., Interest Rate Swaps in the Municipal Mar-
kets, 10 Mun. Fi. J. 217, 217 (1989) (discussing capacity issues concerning the use of
IRSAs by state and local governmental entities).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. The volume of derivative investments is often measured in terms of the no-
tional value of contracts outstanding because this data is relatively easy to gather, not
because it is an accurate estimate of the actual market value of these instruments. See
Hu, supra note 5, at 1459 n.6. Furthermore, the notional value does not measure the
financial risk involved in these investments. Depending on the type of derivative
product involved, the amount at risk may be significantly less than the product's no-
tional value. United States General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Re-
questers, Financial Derivatives: Actions Needed to Protect the Financial System 35
(1994) [hereinafter G.A.O. Survey]. The G.A.O. Survey revealed that for 14 major
derivatives dealers in the United States, their aggregate "gross exposure to credit
risk" from certain derivatives was 1.8%, or $114 billion, of the total $6.5 trillion no-
tional value of their derivative contracts. Id at 53; see also infra note 79 (discussing
the replacement value of derivatives as a measurement of credit risk in connection
with the use of swap contracts).
14. William P. Rogers, Jr., Interest Rate and Currency Swaps and Related Transac-
tions, in The Swap Market in 1990, at 7, 9 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook
Series No. 689, 1990).
15. International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc., Market Survey High-
lights: Year-Ended 1993 chart, Interest Rate and Currency Swaps: Notional Principal
(1994) [hereinafter ISDA 1993 Market Survey].
In response to the rapid growth of the IRSA market, in 1985, 10 of the largest
IRSA dealers in the United States formed the International Swap Dealers Associa-
tion, Inc. (ISDA, now called the International Swaps and Derivatives Association,
2178 [Vol. 63
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institutions.'6 IRSAs have been extremely popular in the private sec-
tor because, when used properly, they help financial managers hedge
against risk associated with interest-rate volatility and reduce the cost
of capital. 7 IRSAs also have been used to speculate with the hope of
financial gain.' 8
Since the mid-1980s, the volume of IRSAs entered into by govern-
mental units19 has also increased, albeit relatively modestly when
compared to the growth in the use of IRSAs in the private sector.20
Governmental units, like entities in the private sector, have used IR-
SAs to avoid or minimize risk associated with changes in interest rates
Inc.). ISDA's original members were: Bankers Trust Co., Citicorp, First Boston
Corp., Goldman Sachs, Kleinwort Benson Ltd., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith Inc., Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., Morgan Stanley & Co., Salomon Brothers
Inc. and Shearson Lehman Brothers Inc. John P. Forde, Big Firms Involved in Rate
Swaps Form Dealers Association, Bond Buyer, Mar. 8, 1985, at 4, 13. At the end of
1993, ISDA's membership included 69 swaps and derivatives dealers from 13 coun-
tries: Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. ISDA 1993
Market Survey, supra, at Introduction, Members Responding to the YE 1993 Survey.
ISDA works towards the standardization of documentation, accounting practices and
procedures for quoting prices. Trade Group is Formed on Interest Rate Swaps, Wall St.
J., Mar. 8, 1985, at 14. "Given the breadth of the membership of ISDA, its data is the
most comprehensive, and is used extensively as a reference by both market partici-
pants and regulators." Group of Thirty, Derivatives: Practices and Principles, Global
Derivatives Study Group 53 (1993).
16. At year-end 1993, corporate, financial and other private entity IRSAs ac-
counted for 89% of the total notional value of IRSAs outstanding. ISDA 1993 Mar-
ket Survey, supra note 15, at chart, Interest Rate Swaps: Non-ISDA Business/
Location Analysis, Total Notional Principal (U.S. S Equivalent) By Percentage, Year
End 1993.
17. Daniel P. Cunningham et al., Interest Rate and Currency Swaps and Related
Transactions, in Swaps and Other Derivatives in 1993, at 511 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac.
Course Handbook Series No. 815, 1993).
18. G.A.O. Survey, supra note 13, at 25.
19. "A single descriptive term for the issuers of securities in public finance is diffi-
cult" because of the diversity of forms of public institutions. Robert A. Fippinger, The
Securities Law of Public Finance 2 n.6 (2d ed. 1994). Because of the variety of sources
upon which this Note draws, the terms "governmental entities," "governmental
units," "municipalities," the "public sector," "state and local governments" and "tax-
exempt issuers" are used in this Note interchangeably to refer to state, city, county
and other local municipalities as well as state and local public corporations and public
authorities.
20. In 1986, the municipal swaps market was estimated to be $1.7 billion and by
the end of 1989 was expected to reach $8 billion. Steven Dickson, Municipal Swaps:
A Growing Market Could Challenge Merrill Lynch Stronghold, Bond Buyer, Dec. 11,
1989, at 1. By year-end 1993, the notional value of IRSAs issued by governmental
units in the United States was estimated at approximately $34 billion. ISDA 1993
Market Survey, supra note 15, at chart, Interest Rate Swaps: Non-ISDA Business/
Location Analysis, Total Notional Principal (U.S. S Equivalent) By Percentage, Year
End 1993.
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and to lower the cost of capital.2 ' Some governmental units also have
used IRSAs to speculate. 2
Despite their potential benefits, the results of two recent surveys
indicate that relatively few governmental units use IRSAs. These
"Joint Surveys," performed by the United States General Accounting
Office in 1993 and the Government Finance Officers Association in
1994, combine data compiled from over 3727 of the estimated 50,000 3
state and local governmental units in the United States concerning
their use of derivative products.2 4 The Joint Surveys revealed that no
more than six percent of the respondents have used IRSAs as part of
their debt management strategy.25
Unlike private institutions, before governmental units can enter
into IRSAs, they must first establish that they have statutory authority
21. See, e.g., G. Kris Rao & Emete Hassan, Reducing Risks Tied To Swap-Based
Derivatives, Standard & Poor's CreditWeek Mun., Oct. 31, 1994, at 93 (noting that
governmental units are using IRSAs "in conjunction with bond issues to save interest
costs, increase financial flexibility, synthetically advance refund bond issues,... access
different investor markets[ and] to lock in fixed rates of return on debt service funds
and other floating-rate assets without sacrificing liquidity"); The Effect of Interest Rate
Swaps on the Evaluation of Municipal Credit, Moody's Pub. Fin., Perspective on Mun.
Issues, June 1, 1994, at 1 (noting that IRSAs "can be beneficial debt management
tools for state and local issuers, which may allow issuers to achieve a lower cost of
capital than otherwise available using traditional financing alternatives"); J. Chester
Johnson, Swapping for a Better Rate, Am. City & County, June 1993, at 12 (noting
that under certain conditions IRSAs "can be an effective instrument for state and
local government debt management and investment programs").
22. Government speculation with public funds implicates a variety of public policy
concerns. For example, government fiscal mismanagement, such as taking excessive
risks with public funds, violates the public policy principles of "balancing stability with
flexibility .... maintaining political responsiveness" and "intergenerational equity."
M. David Gelfand, State & Local Gov't Debt Fmn. § 9:02, at 5-7 (1993). The principle
of intergenerational equity means that governmental entities should ensure that each
"generation of taxpayers" pays for its own "'stream of use' of governmental projects
and services." Id at 5 & n.7 (quoting R. Musgrave & P. Musgrave, Public Finance in
Theory and Practice 585-91 (1973)). This principle "is violated when one generation
of residents is permitted to enjoy a low tax level by borrowing to finance a project
that will produce no benefits for future generations, who will have to bear the burden
of debt service on the project." Id See also Joanne Morrison, PSA's President Ad-
vises Municipalities Not to Run Scared From Derivatives, Bond Buyer, Nov. 4, 1994, at
3 [hereinafter Morrison, PSA's President] (explaining that governmental units should
use derivatives "as a hedge and not to speculate"); Joanne Morrison, Derivatives
Transactions Could Lead to Credit Downgrades, S&P Report Says, Bond Buyer, Nov.
1, 1994, at 7 [hereinafter Morrison, Derivatives Transactions] (noting that speculative
use of IRSAs by governmental units could result in a credit rating downgrade).
23. Albert C. Bashawaty, Presentation on Risk Management for J.P. Morgan's
Municipal Clients 5 (Oct. 3, 1991) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
24. The Government Finance Officers Association conducted a survey of govern-
mental units in the United States in 1994 and combined the results of its survey with
those of the G.A.O. Survey, supra note 13, that was completed in 1993. The com-
bined results of these surveys are reported by Betsy Dotson et al., Financial Deriva-
tives: Governments as End Users, Gov't Fin. Rev., Aug. 1994, at 13 [hereinafter Joint
Surveys].
25. Joint Surveys, supra note 24, at 15-16.
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to enter into IRSAs. 6 One reason that relatively few governmental
units use IRSAs is that most governmental units in the United States
lack express statutory authority to enter into IRSAs." Over the past
several years, however, a growing number of state legislatures have
expressly authorized some or all of the governmental units in theirjurisdictions to enter into IRSAs. In 1987, California and Florida
adopted legislation giving governmental units in their respective juris-
dictions access to a variety of modem financial tools to enable them to
maximize their use of public funds?' The California Legislature
found that while a variety of financial instruments are available to
help reduce risk and costs, many of its governmental units within its
jurisdiction did not have express statutory authority to use those
tools.3" The California Legislature responded by expressly permitting
all governmental units within the state to enter into IRSAs and other
forms of derivative instruments.3 The Florida Legislature made a
similar finding32 and enacted legislation specifically enabling certain
governmental units to enter into IRSAs and other types of derivative
contracts.33
Providing express authority, however, is not enough to make the
benefits of IRSAs available to governmental entities. Many existing
statutes expressly granting governmental units the authority to enter
into IRSAs share a common defect: an absence of adequate systems
of oversight and control of governmental units' use of these financial
tools.' Although the Joint Surveys revealed that eighty-seven per-
cent of the governmental units that have used IRSAs report favorably
on the use of these agreements to manage debt or to lower the cost of
capital,35 the 1994 bankruptcy filings by Orange County, California,
26. McGavin, supra note 9, at 217. Twenty-five percent of the 3727 respondents to
the Joint Surveys reported that they "are from jurisdictions not legally authorized to
use derivative products." Joint Surveys, supra note 24, at 15 (Exhibit 5).
27. Approximately 15 states and the District of Columbia have given all or virtu-
ally all governmental units within their jurisdictions express statutory authority to
enter into IRSAs. Eleven other states have given this express authority to only one or
two governmental units within their jurisdictions. Group of Thirty, Derivatives: Prac-
tices and Principles, Appendix I: Legal Enforceability: Survey of Nine Jurisdictions
308-11 (1993).
28. Id.
29. Interestingly, although governmental units in 25 different states have used de-
rivatives, over one-third of the total number of governmental units that have used
derivatives were from California and Florida. Joint Surveys, supra note 24, at 15.
30. Cal. Gov't Code § 5920 (West Supp. 1995).
31. Id. § 5922(a). The State of California, as well as "any department, agency,
board, commission, or authority of the state, or any city, city and county, county,
public district, public corporation, authority, agency, board, commission, or other
public entity" may enter into IRSAs. Id. § 5921.
32. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 159.822(4) (West 1990).
33. Id. § 159.825(6).
34. See infra notes 337-48 and accompanying text.
35. The Joint Surveys revealed that "87 percent of those using derivative products
indicated that the goals for including derivative products were completely accom-
1995] 2181
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and the Orange County Investment Poo 3 6 indicate that the lack of
adequate oversight of governmental unit's use of derivatives can result
in increased costs and risks.
Yet, IRSAs, when used and monitored properly, can actually help
reduce risks and costs. 37 The lack, however, of express statutory au-
thority, combined with the absence of adequate oversight and control
of governmental units' use of IRSAs, results in a variety of undesir-
able consequences. By failing to grant certain governmental units ex-
press statutory authority to enter into IRSAs and to monitor their use,
state legislatures effectively compel governmental units to take unnec-
essary risks with public funds or to forgo opportunities to reduce
costs.
38
This Note argues that state legislatures 39 should protect and opti-
mize the use of public funds by enacting legislation that expressly au-
plished; 10 percent indicated the goals were only partially accomplished." Joint
Surveys, supra note 24, at 15.
36. See infra notes 252-306 and accompanying text.
37. See supra notes 1-3 and infra notes 131-51 and accompanying text.
38. "[S]ome forms of derivatives have become so fundamental to prudent finan-
cial management that a financial manager of a public entity might be negligent if he or
she did not consider the use of derivatives." Pryor, McClendon, Counts & Co., Inc.,
Testimony to [New York State] Assembly Ways [and] Means Committee 1 (Jan. 17,
1995) (on fie with the Fordham Law Review).
"The economic costs of lost opportunities are real for taxpayers, though
less overt and sensational than the kind of portfolio blunders that have made
the evening news .... [The] risk... includ[es] the risk that a municipality
will pay 10 basis points more than it needed to on a bond because of fear and
loathing of the 'D' word."
Morrison, PSA's President, supra note 22, at 3 (quoting Heather Ruth, former Presi-
dent of the Public Securities Association).
39. State and local governmental units are generally exempt from federal securi-
ties regulation. In 1975, by passage of the "Tower Amendment" (15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 78j(b), 78-0-4, 78-o-4(d)) as part of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 (Pub.
L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified, as amended, in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.A.
(West 1981. & Supp. 1993))), Congress chose to continue to exempt state and local
governments from most securities regulation. The Tower Amendment was meant
to insure that the 1934 [Securities Exchange] Act (as amended) [ch. 404, 48
Stat. 881 (codified in 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-78kk (West 1981 & Supp. 1991))]
would not "tamper in any way with prerogatives of state and local govern-
ments in their sale of securities." Thus, in 1975 Congress merely ratified the
approach taken in 1934 with respect to municipal securities. It chose, again,
for possibly "obvious political reasons," to exempt municipalities themselves
from regulation while subjecting others in the municipal securities market to
the Act's regulatory scheme.
In re New York City Municipal Securities Litigation, 507 F. Supp. 169, 183 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (quoting 121 Cong.Rec. 6188 (1975) (remarks of Senator Williams)); see also
Mark E. Laughman, Note, The Leaning Tower: Do the Proposed Amendments to
SEC Rule 15c2-12 Violate the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975?, 69 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 1167, 1197 (1994) (arguing that the then-proposed (now-adopted) amendments
to SEC Rule 15c2-12 (Securities and Exchange Act Release No. 26985 (June 28, 1989)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12)) indirectly requiring municipal issuers to provide
ongoing financial disclosure information to purchasers or prospective purchasers of
municipal securities "exceed the original congressional mandate for regulating the
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thorizes major governmental units to enter into IRSAs and by
establishing and enforcing appropriate control and oversight
procedures.4
Part I of this Note examines the fundamental structure of IRSAs
and their development, benefits and risks and explores why more gov-
ernmental units do not use IRSAs as part of their overall fiscal strate-
gies. Part II focuses on some of the undesirable consequences that
attend governmental units' lack of express statutory authority to enter
into IRSAs, and, in cases where express statutory authority does exist,
the undesirable consequences that result from an absence of sufficient
oversight and controls. Part IlI reviews legislation enacted by some
states expressly authorizing governmental units to enter into IRSAs as
well as some of the ways in which authority to enter into IRSAs may
municipal bond industry" because "it [is] clear that Congress did not contemplate the
direct or indirect regulation of municipal issuers with the passage of the 1975
Amendments").
There has been considerable debate over the Tower Amendment's provisions ex-
empting state and local governmental units from securities regulation. For example,
in 1975, then-SEC Commissioner A.A. Sommer, Jr., called for its repeal. The Big
Push to Revive Municipal-Bond Market, U.S. News & World Rep., Dec. 22, 1975, at
72, 73. Mr. Sommer commented that it is "'amazing' that neither the SEC nor the
new [Municipal Securities Rule-Making Board, which was established by the 1975
amendments to the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 to develop, for the first time,
standards of conduct for municipal bond dealers,] has the power to require municipal-
bond issuers to give investors the information they need." Id. at 73. Tower Amend-
ment proponents, mainly municipal bond dealers and issuers, argued that separation
of powers issues were at the heart of the debate. kd " 'The very essence of the federal
system is at stake. The separation of powers between State and Federal Government
is fundamental to our freedom in this country."' Ild (quoting RtE.D. Chase, then-
managing partner of the municipal-bond firm of R. E. D. Chase & Partners).
More recently, in the wake of the 1994 Orange County, California, bankruptcies,
the rallying call for the Tower Amendment's repeal has intensified. Republican
United States Representatives Jim Leach, House Banking Committee Chairman, and
Christopher Cox, a member of the House Commerce Committee, have vowed to re-
peal the Tower Amendment. Joanne Morrison & Lynn S. Hume, Next Banking Chair-
man Plans Bill to Repeal Tower Amendment, Bond Buyer, Dec. 20, 1994, at 1. Rep.
Leach noted that repealing the Tower Amendment would require municipal issuers to
make " 'the same full disclosures as private sector enterprises that go to the market.'"
Id See also John H. Allan, Repeal Tower, Bond Buyer, Dec. 27, 1994, at 6 (arguing
that the Tower Amendment should be repealed because it "has blocked a healthy,
full-fledged development of the municipal bond market").
40. Mark Brickell, a former chairman of the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association, Inc., stated, "'It's our view that if governments are to use swaps effec-
tively to manage their risks, they need to have unambiguous authority to enter into
them.'" Lynn S. Hume, Issuers Anxious to Participate in Swaps Must First Surmount
Two State Law Hurdles, Bond Buyer, Oct. 22, 1991, at 2A. Furthermore, "[m]ost
bond officials and lawyers say the municipal swap market would benefit if issuers had
model legislation for swaps." lIL New York City's Comptroller has noted that "[i]t
would be appropriate for the Legislature to ensure that municipalities have sufficient
oversight, checks and balances and disclosure" in connection with their use of deriva-
tigves. Alan G. Hevesi, Testimony on the Use of Derivatives to the New York State
Assembly Ways and Means Committee 3 (Jan. 17, 1995) (on file with the Fordham
Law Review).
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be implied from other existing statutory powers. This part also re-
views some of the benefits of express statutory authority to enter into
IRSAs. In addition, this part proposes principles and guidelines that
should be embodied in legislation specifically authorizing governmen-
tal units' use of IRSAs. Most importantly, such legislation should in-
clude specific guidelines governing governmental units' use of IRSAs
as well as periodic reporting requirements by governmental units to
legislative and regulatory bodies.
This Note concludes that state legislatures' failure to enact legisla-
tion expressly authorizing governmental units to enter into IRSAs, as
well as their failure to ensure that governmental units use these finan-
cial instruments in an appropriate and prudent manner, forces govern-
mental financial managers to take unnecessary risks with public funds.
State legislatures, to fulfill their responsibilities as administrators of
public funds, should enact legislation that incorporates the principles
and guidelines proposed in part III of this Note.
I. BACKGROUND
This part outlines the development of the use of IRSAs, describes
IRSAs' structural components, discusses the functions and purposes
of IRSAs and explores why more governmental units do not make
greater use of IRSAs.
A. Interest Rate Swap Agreements: A Modern Financial Tool
Innovations in financial services over the centuries have included a
wide variety of financial tools, from the use of coinage by the Greek
state of Lydia in the 7th century B.C. to the use of automatic teller
machines.4 Developments in financial services have continued in re-
cent decades at an exceptionally rapid pace.42 As one observer noted:
The past decade has been a golden age for innovation in corporate
and international finance. Fueled by advances in computer technol-
ogy and financial theory and attracted by opportunities created by
extreme volatility in financial markets, financial institutions have
been introducing capital market instruments and techniques at an
unprecedented rate .... [T]hese new products punctuate and de-
fine the modern financial landscape.
43
IRSAs are among the most popular of the relatively new financial
tools that have been developed and used by private and public institu-
tions worldwide.44 In a simple IRSA, one counterparty agrees to pay
to the other a fixed-interest rate on the notional value of the contract,
41. See Mark D. Flood, 7vo Faces of Financial Innovation, 74 Fed. Reserve Bank
of St. Louis Rev. 3, 3 (SeptJOct. 1992).
42. Id
43. Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, The Modem Process of Financial Innovation and the
Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 333, 334-35 (1989).
44. Hu, supra note 5, at 1464-65; G.A.O. Survey, supra note 13, at 34-35.
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and the other counterparty agrees to pay a floating rate of interest on
the same amount.45 Generally, the two counterparties periodically net
out their positions so that, for example, if the fixed rate of interest is
higher than the floating rate of interest, the counterparty paying the
fixed rate will make a payment of the difference between the two rates
to the counterparty whose payments are based on the floating-interest
rate.6 Typically, IRSA counterparties are investment banks that
charge a fee for entering into IRSAs. 7
To better understand the basic structure of a "plain vanilla ' 48
IRSA, it is useful to put "Wall Street" aside for the moment and look
to more familiar territory.49 Suppose that you have a mortgage of
$100,000 with a fixed-interest rate of eight percent. Suppose further
that the income from which you must pay your mortgage is earned
from variable-rate investments such as a portfolio of short-term Treas-
ury bills that mature and are rolled over frequently. They are secure
and highly liquid but offer a relatively low rate of return. In this situa-
tion, the rate at which you earn interest is less than the fixed rate you
must pay on your mortgage. You decide that it is in your interest to
improve your cash flow by more closely matching your income rate
with your expense rate. Assume, however, that your mortgage loan
agreement does not permit you to refinance your mortgage and con-
vert it to a lower floating-rate mortgage.
Now suppose that your sister also has a mortgage of $100,000. Your
sister's mortgage is at a variable rate, currently six percent. (For this
example, also assume that your sister's mortgage has the same amorti-
zation schedule as your own.) Suppose further that your sister earns
income at a fixed rate produced from long-term municipal bonds.
While her investment income easily covers her costs for now, she
wants to avoid the risk that higher short-term rates will drive up the
cost of her mortgage. It would, therefore, be in her best interest to
make mortgage payments at an acceptable fixed rate. While your sis-
ter's mortgage company will permit her to refinance her mortgage
from a variable rate to a fixed rate, it will charge her points to com-
plete the transaction, and it is currently charging nine percent on
fixed-rate loans.
The solution for the two of you may be to enter into an IRSA. Be-
cause your banks will not allow either of you simply to exchange your
mortgage obligations, you agree to "swap" interest obligations based
on $100,000, the principal amounts of your outstanding mortgages.
45. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
46. Satyajit Das, Swap Financing 32-33 (1989).
47. Id at 34.
48. Id at 354.
49. This hypothetical scenario is based on an example developed by Thomas L
Amenta, Deputy Director of Finance, and Steven F. Bracy, Esq., of the State of New
York Metropolitan Transportation Authority.
1995] 2185
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You will pay your sister a variable rate, pegged perhaps to a published
short-term Treasury bill rate, which is currently six percent, based on
the agreed-upon amount of $100,000. Your sister will pay you a fixed
rate of eight percent on the same amount. You and your sister will
then periodically net out the payments you owe to each other. For
example, in the first period, your sister owes you eight percent, but
you owe your sister six percent. Therefore, your sister will pay you
two percent, which you can then apply to your mortgage payment.
Even though you cannot refinance your fixed-rate mortgage and
convert it to a variable-rate mortgage, you have nevertheless accom-
plished your goal of improving your cash flow, at least at the outset.
But, more importantly, you have effectively converted your fixed-rate
expense into a variable-rate expense that more closely matches the
variable-rate income you earn.
Your sister also has accomplished her goals. While her interest cost
initially has risen two percent, she has, in effect, converted her varia-
ble-rate expense into a fixed-rate expense of only eight percent, as
opposed to the nine percent fixed-rate expense she would have in-
curred had she refinanced her variable-rate mortgage. She also has
avoided the payment of points to refinance her variable-rate mort-
gage. But, more significantly, she has stabilized her liability and tai-
lored it in relation to her assets. As a result, she has protected herself
against additional exposure due to upward fluctuations in the interest
rate on variable-rate mortgages. She will also forgo any spread bene-
fits if mortgage rates decrease. She has elected, however, to pay this
"price" to achieve her goal of financial stability.
It is, of course, important to remember that back on "Wall Street,"
swap agreements are not limited to interest-rate exchanges; they can
and do include much more complex transactions.50 Typically, an
IRSA is a custom-tailored agreement devised to meet the particular
needs of the contracting parties.5' Thus, even within the category of
IRSAs, any particular agreement can be structured in a variety of
ways-limited only perhaps by the needs, technology and innovation
of the parties involved. Despite the potential complexity of these cus-
tomized financial arrangements, two fundamental types of IRSAs ex-
ist: fixed-to-floating-rate IRSAs and floating-to-fixed-rate IRSAs5 2
In a fixed-to-floating-rate IRSA, counterparty A makes payments
to counterparty B based on a floating rate of interest. 3 Counterparty
50. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 14, at 11 (noting that the overall swap market
involves various "swap" techniques including interest rate swaps, currency swaps,
cross-currency swaps, swap options and commodity price swaps).
51. Group of Thirty, supra note 15, at 3.
52. Gay Shanahan & Marian Zucker, Presentation to Institute for International
Research, Conference on Municipal Swaps Regarding Municipal Swap Mechanics:
Successfully Exchanging Interest Rate Payment Terms (June 11, 1990) (Introduction
to Interest Rate Swaps) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
53. Id at chart, Fixed-to-Floating Interest Rate Swap.
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A calculates the interest by using an agreed-upon index, such as LI-
BOR54 or the J.J. Kenny Index,5 5 multiplied by the agreed-upon no-
tional value of the contract. A then receives payments from B based
on an agreed-upon fixed rate. The net result is that A achieves a
fixed-rate liability in exchange for a floating-rate liability.
In a floating-to-fixed-rate IRSA, A makes payments to B based on
an agreed-upon, fixed-interest rate and receives payments based on a
floating rate of interest determined by the agreed-upon index. The
net result is that A effectively converts a floating-rate liability into a
fixed-rate liability. Thus, an IRSA is a form of derivative because its
value is based upon, or derived from, the interest rates or indices uti-
lized by the counterparties and the notional value of the contract.56
As with any other financial transaction, the decision to enter into an
IRSA requires an assessment of its risks.57 The risks associated with
IRSAs "are the same kinds of risks found in traditional financial prod-
ucts."'5 8 These risks can be grouped into four broad categories: legal,
credit, market and operational.5 9
The legal risk is the risk that losses may result because the agree-
ment is not enforceable. 60 For example, an IRSA may be unenforce-
able if the IRSA documentation is insufficient,6' or in the case of a
governmental unit, if it does not have the legal capacity to enter into
the contract.62 This risk can be avoided if the governmental unit has
express statutory authority to enter into IRSAs.'
Credit risk is the risk that a counterparty to an IRSA may default or
suffer serious financial difficulties.64 A default may occur if an IRSA
counterparty fails to make interest payments in accordance with the
54. The London Interbank Offered Rate is typically associated with variable-rate
financing of taxable projects. LIBOR is the "rate that most creditworthy interna-
tional banks dealing in Eurodollars (U.S. dollars on deposit in foreign banks) charge
each other for large loans." id. at chart, Peg to an Index.
55. The JJ. Kenny Index is typically associated with variable-rate financing of
non-taxable, municipal projects. ld. at chart, The JJ. Kenny Index.
56. Joint Surveys, supra note 24, at 13.
57. Das, supra note 46, at 521.
58. Group of Thirty, supra note 15, at 2.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 51.
61. Id.
62. Id.; see also Kenneth S. McCormick, Pricing and Risk Evaluation, in Inside the
Swap Market 29, 30 (3d ed. 1988) (discussing "customer risk assessment, Le., the rela-
tive likelihood of a given customer to default, thus requiring a higher or lower credit
fee applied to the measured exposure" when pricing an IRSA); Aaron Pressman,
Dealers Take Risks if Authorization for Municipalities' Swaps is Unclear, Bond Buyer,
Mar. 2, 1994, at 6 (noting that counterparties to IRSAs with governmental units
"take[ ] on one risk the municipality probably will not-authorization risk").
63. Group of Thirty, supra note 15, at 2; see also Joan Pryde, Issuers Pulling Plugs
on Swaps That Lacked State's Legal Authority, Bond Buyer, May 5, 1993, at 4 (noting
that some governmental units have had to rescind IRSAs because they later discov-
ered that they were prohibited from entering into IRSAs under state law).
64. Group of Thirty, supra note 15, at 47.
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parties' agreement. 65 This risk can be minimized by requiring pay-
ment netting66 at frequent periodic intervals during the IRSA's
term,67 requiring the counterparty to collateralize the IRSA or obtain
insurance, or selecting only financially sound, highly rated
counterparties.68
Market risk is the risk associated with changes in interest rates over
the term of the IRSA.69 How one assesses this risk and attempts to
minimize it is largely dependent upon the structure of the IRSA and
the parties' financial positions and goals in entering into the IRSA.70
For instance, in the mortgage example used earlier, your sister may
forgo savings in interest costs if mortgage rates go down, but she has
decided that it is in her best financial interest to enter into this ar-
rangement to protect herself against the possibility that the variable
rate on her mortgage will increase. Market risk assessment also is de-
pendent upon market conditions during the IRSA's term and at its
conclusion-factors that cannot be determined at the IRSA's incep-
tion.71 This risk can be hedged, for example, by monitoring the IRSA
over its term, budgeting for interest-rate payments or making the in-
terest-rate payment obligation subordinate to other debt obligations a
party may have.72
Finally, operational risk is described as the risk that losses will occur
due to deficient "systems and control, human error, or management
failure."73 Operational risk can be mitigated, among other ways, by
65. Id.
66. In payment netting, the payment obligations of the IRSA counterparties to
each other are netted out so that only one counterparty is obligated to make a pay-
ment to the other. Michael Canby, The Group of Thirty Global Derivatives Study:
Enforceability Survey-England, in Swaps and Other Derivatives in 1994, at 417, 432
(PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 848, 1994).
67. Das, supra note 46, at 536.
68. Group of Thirty, supra note 15, at 49.
69. Das, supra note 46, at 521.
70. Rao & Hassan, supra note 21, at 94.
71. Das, supra note 46, at 521 (emphasis omitted). Other "key considerations"
include: basis risk, liquidity risk and swap rollover risk. Standard & Poor's Mun. Fin.
Criteria 1994, Municipal Derivatives in the Primary Market 150, 151 (1994). Basis
risk is the risk that an index used to calculate interest payments under an IRSA, such
as LIBOR or the JJ. Kenny index, and the counterparties' contemplated target rate
of interest may "diverge sharply because of market or issuer-specific changes," and
that the governmental unit will have to pay the "difference between the interest rate
on its floating rate debt and the rate paid by the counterparty" to the IRSA. Id. at
151. Liquidity risk is risk associated with short-term, variable-rate demand obliga-
tions. Id Swap rollover risk is the risk associated with a gap that could occur if the
IRSA's term does not match the term of the governmental unit's outstanding debt. Id.
72. See Rao & Hassan, supra note 21, at 94.
73. Group of Thirty, supra note 15, at 50. For example, in 1991, Lehman Brothers,
which had been commissioned by the Public Parking Authority of Pittsburgh to re-
view the parking authority's finances, issued a report critical of an IRSA entered into
by the parking authority in 1989 with Merrill Lynch Capital Markets. Mary Radford,
Lehman Takes on Merrill in Swap Controversy, Investment Dealers' Dig., Mar. 25,
1991, at 5. The Lehman Brothers report indicated that the IRSA resulted in "'an
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maintaining a system of oversight by "informed and involved senior
management,"'74 documenting procedures and policies and conducting
independent audits to verify that the procedures and policies are
followed.75
While IRSAs, like other financial products, are not risk free,76 the
tremendous expansion of the IRSA market and the relatively low rate
of losses associated with IRSAs7 suggest that the risk of losses rela-
tive to the benefits derived is acceptable to many institutions.78
estimated net present value loss of ($812,628) rather than the net present value bene-
fit of $809,058 as reported by Merrill Lynch.'" Id. at 6. Among its findings, Lehman
Brothers asserted that Merrill Lynch had significantly miscalculated the IRSA's fixed
rate. Id The report also "implied [that the parking authority's] officials did not un-
derstand all the risks accompanying the transaction. And some swap providers and
rating agencies have expressed concern that such naivety is common." Steven Dick-
son, Municipal Swap Market Growing Up: Development Mirrors Early Corporates,
But Product Carries Risks All Its Own, Bond Buyer, Apr. 26, 1991, at 4A. Thus,
although entering into IRSAs "can be a useful debt and asset management tool, ... if
[an IRSA] is not structured properly or is done without understanding, 'it can lead to
a credit rating downgrade.'" Morrison, Derivatives Transactions, supra note 22, at 7
(quoting G. Kris Rao, a director in the municipal finance area of Standard & Poor's
Corp., a credit rating agency).
74. Group of Thirty, supra note 15, at 50.
75. Id.
76. While "[d]esigning a swap is theoretically straightforward,... implementing
the design is more complex. The success of the implementation hinges upon the qual-
ity of component parts. The major factor in the quality is the validity of the informa-
tion which forms the basis of the model." Allan S. Wilson, Designing a Swap Package,
in Inside the Swap Market 33, 36 (3d ed. 1988). See also Reasonable Assessment of
Risk is Possible in Ballooning Interest Rate Swaps Markets, Thomson's Int'l Banking
Regulator, Apr. 20, 1992, at 8 (noting that while calculation of swap credit exposures
is somewhat complex, a significant amount of information is currently available in
public reports and an increasing amount can be expected in the future that would
enable a reasonable assessment of credit exposure on IRSA transactions). For a more
detailed analysis of the risks associated with IRSAs and other forms of derivative
contracts, see Das, supra note 46.
77. See supra notes 13-16 and infra notes 112-21 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing, respectively, the growth in the use of IRSAs and a survey indicating that losses
resulting from swaps have been relatively low).
78. Robert Godfrey, Derivatives: Is Their Shady Reputation Undeserved?, Am.
City & County, Aug. 1994, at 27.
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B. Private Sector Use of IRSAs
The total notional value 9 of IRSAs outstanding worldwide
mushroomed from $3 billion in 1982 to over $6 trillion in 1993.80 Pri-
vate sector IRSAs accounted for over $5 trillion of the total notional
value of IRSAs outstanding at the end of 1993.1 The development
and use of IRSAs accelerated over the past two decades as financial
managers sought ways to hedge risks associated with interest rates
that were becoming increasingly volatile.81 Financial managers, with
the aid of advances in finance, information processing and communi-
cations technologies, devised IRSAs, among other financial tools, as a
means of hedging against the risks associated with this volatility.8 3
The benefits of these transactions, while clearly advantageous for the
institutions involved, often indirectly inure to consumers as well.'
79. While the size of the derivatives markets is typically measured by the total
notional value outstanding because of the relative availability of these figures, this
measurement does not accurately reflect the value of these investments or the amount
of risk associated with derivatives overall. Hu, supra note 5, at 1464-65. Recently,
ISDA announced the results of a pilot survey that measured the cost to replace deriv-
atives, a more accurate measurement of the credit exposure tied to derivative transac-
tions. ISDA News Release, ISDA Announces Results of Pilot Survey That Measures
Derivatives Replacement Values 1 (June 9, 1994).
The survey, conducted among 14 leading dealers around the world who are
represented on ISDA's board of directors, clearly demonstrates that replace-
ment values-the current credit exposures of outstanding derivatives trans-
actions-are a small percentage of their notional amounts.
At yearend 1993, the net replacement value of the interest rate and cur-
rency swaps outstanding at the firms participating in the pilot survey was
$101.3 billion, or 1.22% of their $7.6 trillion notional amount. The gross
replacement value of the swaps outstanding was $178.4 billion, or 2.15% of
the notional amount. The difference between net and gross values is that net
value reflects the netting of transactions written under an enforceable
master agreement. Such agreements reduce derivatives credit exposure.
Id. The survey also indicated that the participants' "credit exposure from derivatives
was significantly less than their credit exposure from other financial activities" such as
loans and letters of credit. Id. at 2.
80. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
81. ISDA 1993 Market Survey, supra note 15, at chart, Interest Rate and Currency
Swaps: Notional Principal.
82. Hu, supra note 43, at 336-37.
83. Joint Surveys, supra note 24, at 13.
84. Jeffrey L. Seltzer, a managing director at Lehman Brothers and chairman of
the Securities Industry Association's swaps and derivatives committee, observed:
'"Consumers are the ultimate beneficiaries of the swap market, even though they're
not directly involved in the transactions.'" Kenneth Silber, Derivatives Lend Fear to
Market, Insight, Jan. 31, 1994, at 12, 13. For example, "McDonald's... gets cheaper
financing for its franchises through interest-rate swaps-an activity that helps keep
hamburger prices down." Id. at 13.
IRSAs also help banks to provide a very beneficial product, pre-approved mort-
gages, to home buyers every day:
Thousands of home buyers offered up silent prayers of thanks for pre-ap-
proved mortgages as consumer interest rates suddenly shot up by two per-
centage points in [mid-1994]. But few realized that their prayers should have
been directed to the god of financial engineering. Pre-approved mortgage
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The Student Loan Marketing Association ("Sallie Mae"), a feder-
ally chartered, private company,s5 for example, uses IRSAs to help
provide billions of dollars in government-guaranteed student loans to
college students. 6 As "[o]ne of the biggest players in the swaps mar-
kets,"' Sallie Mae regularly issues fixed-rate bonds to raise funds to
buy student loans from the country's colleges and banks.' The loans
it buys earn interest at a floating rate.89 Sallie Mae uses IRSAs to
convert synthetically the variable rate of interest it earns on its loans
to a fixed rate that more closely matches the fixed rate it must pay on
its outstanding bond obligations. 90 By using IRSAs, Sallie Mae is bet-
ter able to manage risks associated with changes in interest rates.91 If
interest rates were to rise sharply, Sallie Mae could end up collecting
less interest on the loans it buys than it must pay out on the bonds it
issues. 2 "As lots of savings and loans learned in the early 1980s, that
can be fatal."'93 Sallie Mae could avoid this interest-rate risk by issu-
ing floating-rate bonds directly to investors, however, investors prefer
to purchase fixed-rate bonds so that they will know with certainty the
amount of interest they will earn on their investments.94 Because it
can use IRSAs as part of its financial strategy, Sallie Mae's options are
expanded. Rather than simply issuing floating-rate bonds, which, in
this case, is likely to be more costly than issuing fixed-rate bonds, Sal-
lie Mae enters into IRSAs to reduce the risk associated with interest-
rate volatility and is able to achieve more effectively its objective of
providing consumers with government-backed student loans.95
contracts assure consumers that if they buy a house within the 60- or 90-day
period before the contract expires, they will be entitled to borrow mortgage
money at interest rates no higher than those in effect at the time their con-
tract was signed. If interest rates fall during that period, they are guaranteed
the new, lower rates, and if they choose not to buy a house, they can walk
away without paying a penny. Those features may seem simple but, in fact,
they transfer the buyers' risk that interest rates will go up while they are
house hunting to the bank. And for a bank that might have millions of dol-
lars worth of pre-approved mortgages outstanding at any time, a hike in in-
terest rates could be costly. However, by using [IRSAs,] banks can hedge
that risk.
Brenda Dalglish, A High-Stakes Game: Concerns About Financial "Derivative" Prod-
ucts Mount, Maclean's, May 30, 1994, at 20.
85. Jerry Knight, For Sallie Mae, "Swaps" are Key Financing Tool, Wash. Post, Jan.
13, 1993, at Fl.
86. Id.
87. Id. at F2.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id
91. Id. at Fl.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at F2.
95. Id.
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Sears, Roebuck and Co. has also used IRSAs successfully to better
manage its assets and liabilities. 6 Sears began entering into IRSAs in
1983. 97 By late 1984, Sears had executed $2.5 billion in IRSAs. 98
Sears' primary objective was to restructure its debt so that there
would be a fifty-fifty split between debt owed at a variable rate of
interest and debt owed at a fixed rate.9 Sears accomplished its goal
by 1984 by entering into thirty-six IRSAs with fifteen different
counterparties, among them "foreign and domestic banks, investment
bankers, and merchant banks."'(' By entering into these IRSAs,
Sears exchanged a portion of "its short-term and variable-rate debt
for fixed, long-term debt of other issuers, providing itself with protec-
tion against interest-rate rises." 101
While IRSAs have been successfully implemented by an over-
whelming majority of the most active swaps dealers,1°2 there is noth-
ing inherently good or bad about IRSAs. If IRSAs are structured
improperly, poorly monitored or used as a speculative tool with the
hope that interest rates will move in one's favor, they can result in
increased costs and risks.0 3 Losses associated with IRSAs "have
tended to arise less from anything inherent in the derivatives them-
selves and more from basic failures of management. Firms that have
got into derivatives trouble have done so by letting individual employ-
ees trade or invest without proper analysis or supervision. ' ' l 1
Procter & Gamble, for example, blamed IRSAs for losses of $102
million in 1994.105 P&G criticized its IRSA counterparty, Bankers
Trust, for P&G's losses, asserting that Bankers Trust had sold P&G
IRSAs that "were inappropriate for managing [the] firm's interest-
rate risk."'1 6 Yet, P&G also replaced its own treasurer.107 P&G's
chief financial officer explained that those involved did not under-
stand the IRSAs' risks. 108 P&G had entered into "diff" IRSAs.10 9
96. John Morris, Sears, Working to Protect Earnings, Plunges into Interest-Rate
Swaps, Bond Buyer, Oct. 17, 1984, at 3.
97. Id. at 28.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 3.
101. Id.
102. See infra notes 113-21.
103. See, e.g., supra note 73 (discussing losses resulting from an IRSA entered into
by a Pennsylvania governmental unit).
104. The Beauty in the Beast, supra note 8, at 22.
105. Corporate Hedging: Hard Soap, Economist, Apr. 16, 1994, at 82.
106. Id.
107. Id
108. Gabriella Stem & Steven Lipin, Procter & Gamble to Take a Charge to Close
Out Two Interest-Rate Swaps, Wall St. J., Apr. 13, 1994, at A3 (citing Erik G. Nelson).
"When Banker's Trust offered P. & G. an array of [derivative] investments, the com-
pany's managers chose the riskiest ones, with the highest possible reward and the
severest possible loss." Harold Ticktin, Derivatives: The Parker Bros. Test, N.Y.
Tunes, Oct. 9, 1994, at 9.
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The "diff" IRSAs were gambles on the way that German and Ameri-
can interest rates would move in relation to each other, however, the
rates moved contrary to expectations, and because P&G had heavily
leveraged its gamble, it suffered large losses in a relatively short pe-
riod of time."'
The foregoing is just one of the more recent incidents in which pri-
vate institutions have suffered losses in connection with IRSAs."'
Yet, a study conducted by the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association, Inc.1 2 indicated that through the end of 1991, cumulative
losses associated with IRSAs, as well as with several types of similar
transactions," 3 were relatively small." 4 The survey results were
based upon the experiences of a "diverse group of established swap
dealers, representing over 70% of the $4.34 trillion volume of swaps"
and related transactions." 5 The survey revealed that out of a total of
$3.105 trillion in transactions, the total notional value of defaulted
swaps was $12.8 billion. 1 6 The marked-to-market value 17 of the
losses was $358.36 million," 8 just 0.0115% of the total notional value
of the outstanding contracts." 9 Furthermore, nearly one-half of the
losses were attributable to losses in connection with hundreds of IR-
109. Corporate Hedging: Hard Soap, supra note 105, at 82.
110. Id.
111. Another example is Gibson Greetings Inc. In 1994, Gibson reported that it
lost $3 million as a result of IRSAs entered into by company employees without the
authorization of the company's chief financial officer. Gabriella Stem, Gibson Greet-
ings Incurs $3 Million Loss From Unauthorized Interest-Rate Swaps, Wall St. J., Mar.
7, 1994, at A4.
112. See supra note 15.
113. The survey included "interest rate and currency swaps, caps, collars, and
floors." ISDA News Release, New ISDA Survey Measures Swap Defaults and Losses:
Credit Quality of Swap Counterparties Remains Exceptionally High, ISDA News Re-
lease 1 (July 29, 1992) [hereinafter ISDA Default Survey]. "An interest rate cap is an
agreement between the seller or provider of the cap and a borrower to limit the bor-
rower's floating interest rate to a specified level for a period of time." Das, supra note
46, at 57. "An interest rate collar is [an agreement between the collar provider and a
borrower] to limit the borrower's floating interest rate to a band limited by a specified
ceiling and floor rate." Id "An interest rate floor agreement is an agreement be-
tween the [floor] provider and an investor which guarantees that the investor's float-
ing rate of return on investments will not fall below a specified level over an agreed
period of time." Id.
114. ISDA Default Survey, supra note 113, at 1.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1-2.
117. In a "plain vanilla" IRSA, the marked-to-market value means the "value [of
the IRSA] determined by calculating the present value of all expected future cash
flows of the swap. This amount is a function of current interest rates, expected inter-
est rates (yield curve), the remaining maturity of a swap, and the notional principal
amount" Id. at chart, Explanation of Notional Principal and Mark-to-Market Value.
118. The default by the London borough of Hammersmith and Fulham accounted
for nearly 50% of the losses. Id. at 3. See also infra notes 173-207 and accompanying
text (discussing Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council, 2
W.L.R 372 (1991)).
119. ISDA Default Survey, supra note 113, at 2.
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SAs entered into by a borough in Great Britain that had acted ultra
vires of its statutory powers by entering into the IRSAs. 120 In addi-
tion, the survey results indicated that losses from swap transactions
were significantly lower than losses resulting from other traditional
financial transactions in a single year.121 As one observer noted:
[I]f derivatives offered no more than a sort of dangerous sport for
corporate treasurers, they would not have acquired their present
size. Huge, global markets have grown up in them because they
make good financial sense to a large and diverse group of users. By
"hedging" tomorrow's transactions at today's prices, a company
may not increase the profit it makes but it can certainly eliminate
much of the risk involved in making it. 22
Because IRSAs are typically customized agreements, 2 3 they can be
relatively straightforward or can combine risk in a variety of ways. 124
If counterparties enter into IRSAs without adequate expertise and
technological resources, as well as systems for oversight and review,
they may incur significantly increased, rather than decreased, risks
and costs."2 When IRSAs are used and monitored properly, how-
ever, they can provide significant benefits to the institutions that use
them.
C. Governmental Units' Use of IRSAs
Governmental units' use of IRSAs has increased for the same rea-
sons that the use of IRSAs has increased in the private sector.126
Many state and local governmental units, like institutions in the pri-
vate sector, are exposed to risks resulting from interest-rate fluctua-
120. Id at 3.
121. Key results of the survey included findings that
The ratio of notional principal of defaulting transactions (life-to-date) di-
vided by swap transactions outstanding (as of December 31, 1991) [were]
only 0.41%. Even relative to other types of credit losses experienced in a
single year, swap losses compare favorably. For example, according to the
FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile for the period ending December 31, 1991,
5.3% of loans at FDIC insured banks were categorized as non-performing.
Also according to the FDIC, 1.6% of all loans at FDIC insured banks were
charged off during 1991.
Id at 4 ("Analysis of the Results of the ISDA Default Survey").
122. The Beauty in the Beast, supra note 8, at 22.
123. Dalglish, supra note 84, at 21.
124. Group of Thirty, supra note 15, at 3.
125. Id
126. In 1990, the outstanding notional value of IRSAs and related products issued
by state and local governmental units was approximately $15 billion. Mary Radford,
High Performance Munis: How Derivatives Are Changing the Shape of Public Fi-
nance, Investment Dealers' Dig., Jan. 21, 1991, at 18. By year-end 1993, that amount
had more than doubled. ISDA 1993 Market Survey, supra note 15, at chart, Interest
Rate Swaps: Non-ISDA Business/Location Analysis, Total Notional Principal (U.S. $
Equivalent) By Percentage, Year End 1993.
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tions on a daily basis. 27 In fact, state and local governmental units
"probably have more exposure to changing interest rates, given the
much narrower universe of alternate ways to manage this risk."'"
When one considers that the volume of state and local governmental
debt outstanding rose from $365 billion in 1980 to $1.2 trillion in
1993,129 it appears likely that governmental units' interest in using IR-
SAs or other derivatives to generate savings and reduce risk will in-
crease significantly in the future. 130
1. Generating Savings
The most common reason that governmental units enter into IRSAs
is to reduce the cost of borrowing money.' 31 It has been "estimated
that a typical floating-to-fixed-rate [IRSA] saves a municipal issuer
about 10 to 20 basis points132 on its cost of funds, compared with a
conventional fixed-rate structure.' 33 Yet, entering into IRSAs is not
necessarily or automatically beneficial. Governmental units, like their
private sector counterparts, must carefully assess their needs, objec-
tives and resources before entering into IRSAs. They should use an
IRSA only when they are satisfied that the benefits, when weighed
against the risks, make entering into an IRSA an appropriate choice.
For example, in 1990, the State of Connecticut considered, but ulti-
mately rejected, using an IRSA in connection with the sale of a varia-
ble-rate general obligation bond issue of approximately $300 million
to convert the variable rate to a fixed rate.13 Connecticut officials
decided that "'the timing and the size of the issue [were] not opti-
mum.' "135 Connecticut expressed an interest in entering into an
IRSA on a future, somewhat smaller, bond issue of about $200 mil-
127. Bashawaty, supra note 23, at 5.
128. Id.
129. James Flanigan, Debacle Will Cost Every City, Town in the Nation, LA. Tunes,
Dec. 7, 1994, at D1, D3.
130. See, e.g., U. S. Municipal Swap Market Faces Some Growing Pain, Reuters,
July 23, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (noting that in 1991, Mer-
rill Lynch estimated that the municipal IRSA and swap markets have a potential size
of $250 to $300 billion).
131. See, e.g., Joint Surveys, supra note 24, at 15 (noting that 56% of respondents to
the Joint Surveys reported that they used derivative products to reduce borrowing
costs); McGavin, supra note 9, at 219 (noting that most often the reason for entering
into IRSAs "is to convert the effective cost of a borrowing"); Swaps' Popularity In-
creasing in the Municipal Market, Global Guaranty (Am. Banker-Bond Buyer Newsl.
on Credit Enhancement), Sept. 14, 1992, at 7 (noting that IRSAs are popular in the
public sector because of the "need to cut financing costs and the ongoing decline of
federal assistance for municipal capital programs").
132. A basis point is .01%.
133. Swaps' Popularity Increasing In the Municipal Market, supra note 131, at 7.
134. Ted Hampton, Connecticut Decides Variable-Rate Issue's Size Makes Proposed
Swap Deal Too Risky, Bond Buyer, June 6, 1990, at 1.
135. Id. (quoting Assistant Treasurer Benson R Cohn).
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lion. 36 Similarly, in 1993, The City of New York decided to cancel a
complex bond refunding transaction that included an IRSA compo-
nent because "slack demand" and unusually volatile interest-rate
movements at the time complicated the pricing of the transaction. 137
Other governmental units have decided that entering into IRSAs
would help to lower their cost of raising capital. For example, in 1990,
the Dallas/Fort Worth Airport Authority used a "forward commit-
ment"' 38 IRSA in connection with the future refunding of $243.65
million in outstanding bonds.' 39 That transaction, estimated to gener-
ate savings of approximately $2.6 million a year, permitted the airport
"to reduce landing fees ... by approximately six cents per thousand
pounds of landed weight.' 40 In 1992, the Rhode Island Convention
Center Authority used an IRSA in connection with a $225 million
fixed-rate bond sale to convert synthetically the bond's fixed-rate obli-
gations into floating-rate obligations.' 4 1 This transaction will save the
convention center an estimated $11 million over a five-year period. 142
In 1994, The City of New York's $2.2 billion bond sale included an
IRSA for a $500 million floating-rate portion of the issue, effectively
converting the floating-rate portion to a fixed-rate obligation, saving
the city approximately $440,000.143
Some governmental units, after assessing their needs and an IRSA's
benefits and risks, may prudently determine not to use an IRSA at a
given point in time. When used and monitored appropriately, how-
ever, IRSAs have generated significant savings for some governmen-
tal units; these savings can directly benefit taxpayers and consumers in
their jurisdictions.
2. Minimizing Risk
By entering into an IRSA, governmental units also may be able to
minimize risks associated with adverse changes in interest rates. For
example, many governmental units raise funds by issuing bonds that
136. Id at 27. Later in 1990, the State of Connecticut entered into an IRSA with a
notional value of $250 million. Ted Hampton, Can the Municipal Market Handle Bid-
ding for Swaps? Some Have Their Doubts, Bond Buyer, Oct. 22, 1991, at 4A.
137. Aaron Pressman, Turbulent Market Pushes Hedge Derivative Out of New York
City's Debt Refunding Deal, Bond Buyer, Apr. 8, 1993, at 1.
138. In a typical forward-commitment IRSA, the governmental unit contracts now
for an IRSA to take effect in the future when outstanding debt is redeemed. In this
particular transaction, the arrangement allowed "all or a portion of the savings to be
realized before the redemption of the outstanding bonds." D/FW Debt Refinancing to
Save $2.6 Million a Year, Airports, Oct. 23, 1990, at 443.
139. Id
140. Id
141. R. L Convention Center Takes Advantage of New Market, Global Guaranty
(Am. Banker-Bond Buyer Newsl. on Credit Enhancement), Apr. 20, 1992, at 1.
142. Id
143. Aaron Pressman, New York City Sale Features Swap-Backed Floating Rate
Rans, Bond Buyer, Aug. 17, 1994, at 6.
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pay a fixed rate of interest but earn interest on their investments at a
floating rate.'" In such cases, governmental units might better syn-
chronize their assets and liabilities by entering into IRSAs that will
allow them to convert synthetically their fixed-rate obligations into
floating-rate obligations that more closely match the floating rate of
interest they earn on assets. 45 If such governmental units did not
enter into IRSAs and the floating rate of interest earned fell below
their fixed-rate obligations, the governmental units would have to
draw on or generate other revenue to meet their fixed-rate obliga-
tions. Conversely, if the floating rate of interest rose above the fixed-
interest rate, such governmental units would realize a net benefit from
their income and liabilities. Entering into an IRSA to protect against
the risk that interest rates will fall in this relatively simple scenario,
however, also means that if interest rates rise, such governmental
units will not realize the benefit of the spread between their fixed-rate
liabilities and their variable-rate income.
In this scenario, a decision not to enter into an IRSA to hedge
against a drop in interest rates is a decision to take a gamble that the
rate of interest earned on investments will rise. Yet, a decision to
enter into an IRSA to hedge against adverse changes in interest rates
can be a responsible management policy that seeks to match assets
and liabilities in a way that locks in the spread between a portion of a
governmental unit's debts and a corresponding amount of its
investments.
Managing assets and liabilities in this manner has two effects. First,
it quantifies the unit's financial exposure thereby better enabling the
governmental unit to budget for its operations. Second, it protects
against an increase in the spread if the investment returns decrease.
On the other hand, if investment returns increase, the governmental
unit would forgo the benefits that higher investment returns would
have reaped had the governmental unit not entered into the IRSA.
Because the main purpose of using an IRSA for asset/liability man-
agement is to quantify and limit interest-rate risk, the objective of
such a policy is achieved regardless of how interest rates move. Not
entering into an IRSA, or entering into one in the hope that rates
move favorably, increases the governmental unit's exposure to risk.
This point is highlighted by Wall Street's reaction to the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board's 1987 finding that "[o]nly 150 of the 3,536
thrifts insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp.
144. See CS Frst Boston, Municipal Financial Products: An Issuer's Guide 6
(1993).
145. See, e.g., Aaron Pressman, Besides Bringing Additional Savings, Some Swaps
Lower Issuers' Risk Profile, Bond Buyer, Dec. 22, 1993, at 6 (discussing some of the
benefits of entering into IRSAs); Dickson, supra note 20, at 20 (discussing the expan-
sion of the municipal swaps market and the benefits of swaps).
1995] 2197
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
[were] hedging their assets against interest-rate fluctuations." '46 Wall
Street finance specialists expressed the view that "[s]upervisory staff
at the Bank Board [were] 'not doing their jobs' if thrifts have failed to
hedge fixed-rate portfolios."' 47
Unlike most thrift institutions back in 1987, the Louisiana Public
Facilities Authority used an IRSA in 1988 to improve management of
its assets and liabilities."¢ LPFA "issued bonds on a seven-day floater
basis" to purchase debt from local school boards.1 49 The purchased
debt earned interest at a fixed rate.' 50 LPFA then entered into an
IRSA that synthetically converted fixed-rate school board debt to a
floating rate that better matched LPFA's floating-rate bond
obligations. 15 '
D. The Lack of Express Statutory Authority
There are several reasons why more governmental units do not use
IRSAs. Many of the nation's smaller governmental units have rela-
tively small amounts of debt and assets to manage; therefore, they
may -have no need to enter into IRSAs.152 Governmental units that
do not issue debt often or regularly may find that, relative to the size
of their investment portfolios, it does not make sense to invest signifi-
cant amounts of time and effort to become sufficiently knowledgeable
about the use of IRSAs because they will never or only rarely be ben-
eficial in their cases. 53 On the other hand, some governmental units
that could benefit from the use of IRSAs may not understand enough
about IRSAs and their potential benefits.'54 Still other governmental
146. Jim McTague, Bank Board Says Only 150 of 3,536 Thrifts Insured by FSLIC
Use Interest-Rate Hedges, Bond Buyer, May 21, 1987, at 4.
147. Id (quoting Eric Hemel, then a vice president of mortgage finance at First
Boston Corp.).
148. Dickson, supra note 20, at 20.
149. Id.
150. Iat
151. Id.
152. "[Eighty-seven] percent of those using derivative products are from jurisdic-
tions serving populations of more than 100,000" and 53% "issue more than $50 mil-
lion in municipal debt annually." Joint Surveys, supra note 24, at 15; see also Godfrey,
supra note 78, at 29 ([Miore than half of those who answered [the G.A.O. Survey,
supra note 13] said they were not convinced that derivative products could benefit
their jurisdiction.").
153. While the G.A.O. Survey, supra note 13, found that only six percent of respon-
dents were using derivatives,
the 6 percent usage rate probably understates the role that derivatives play
in debt issuance. The use of derivatives tends to come from the ranks of
larger tax-exempt issuers, and the country's largest 300 issuers represent
more than 60 percent of the new-issue tax-exempt debt annually. More than
53 percent of the respondents reporting usage of derivatives said their an-
nual issuance was more than $50 million.
Godfrey, supra note 78, at 28.
154. "Only 4 percent [of those who responded to the G.A.O. Survey, supra note 13]
call themselves 'very knowledgeable' about derivatives. Another 20 percent said they
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units believe that derivatives are excessively risky or too complex. 155
Yet, as Heather Ruth, former president of the Public Securities Asso-
ciation, stressed, deciding not to use derivatives when it is appropriate
to use them may unnecessarily expose governmental units to in-
creased risk and costs. 156 There are, however, many large, sophisti-
cated governmental units that do not have statutory authority to enter
into IRSAs.'57
Before governmental units can enter into IRSAs, they must address
a legal issue unique to governmental entities, that is, whether they
have the statutory authority necessary to execute IRSAs.ts Standard
& Poor's, a credit rating agency, has stressed to governmental units
the importance of legal authority, warning governmental units that if
they lack statutory authority to enter into an IRSA, the IRSA may
terminate for illegality, exposing the governmental unit to "a poten-
tially large termination payment 159 and/or floating-rate exposure."160
S&P recommends that if a governmental unit's statutory authority to
enter into IRSAs is ambiguous, the governmental unit should make
absolutely certain that the authority on which it relies warrants such
reliance.' 6 ' As discussed in part II, entering into IRSAs without ex-
press or clear statutory authority may have potentially serious conse-
quences. For example, although lawyers and regulatory bodies
advised a London borough that the borough was legally authorized to
'know the basics,' while 77 percent said they have some, little or no knowledge about
derivatives." Id.
155. Thirty-six percent of the respondents to the Joint Surveys who are not consid-
ering the use of derivative products said the risks were excessive, while 38% said they
were too complex. Joint Surveys supra note 24, at 15.
156. "'[Plublic reaction to derivatives may have gone too far .... [A]voiding the
use of financial products can also be a risk to issuers and investors . .. .
[M]unicipalities should not overreact to recent reports of losses and increased atten-
tion given to derivatives in the media." Morrison, PSA's President, supra note 22, at
3.
157. "Twenty-five percent [of the respondents to the G.A.O. Survey, supra note 13]
said their jurisdiction did not allow the use of derivatives." Godfrey, supra note 78, at
29; see also infra notes 261-65 and accompanying text (discussing that such govern-
mental units may be reluctant to enter into IRSAs even when the use of IRSAs is
financially prudent).
158. McGavin, supra note 9, at 220-21; see also Morrison, PSA's President, supra
note 22, at 3 (reporting that Heather Ruth, former president of the Public Securities
Association, warned state and local governmental units "to make sure they are au-
thorized to make certain investments. 'This is fundamentally your responsibility-not
the responsibility of people who come to you with investment ideas.' ").
159. Rao & Hassan, supra note 21, at 94-95. A termination payment is the pay-
ment that may be owed to or received by a counterparty upon the IRSA's involuntary
termination caused by events such as counterparty payment default, bankruptcy, liq-
uidation or a downgrade in the counterparty's credit rating. Id.
160. Id. at 94.
161. "[While m]any states have statutes that give the issuers' [sic] the authority to
enter into swap agreements[, b]y contrast, there are states that prohibit the use of
swaps or have legislation that is ambiguous. If the law is ambiguous, S&P suggests
that an issuer verify its legal authority." Id. at 94-95.
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enter into IRSAs, Great Britain's highest court found that the bor-
ough had acted ultra vires of its statutory authority by entering into
hundreds of IRSA transactions. 62
Furthermore, although a growing number of state legislatures have
enacted legislation expressly authorizing governmental units in their
jurisdictions to enter into IRSAs, the authorizing legislation often
does not provide adequate, comprehensive reporting systems and con-
trols that are regarded in this industry as integral components of a
financial strategy that uses IRSAs to hedge risk and reduce costs. 163
In other words, a bald authorization to enter into IRSAs or other
forms of derivatives-without provisions for adequate guidelines,
oversight and review-also can result in increased exposure to risks
and losses as well as other undesirable consequences.
II. UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES
Several undesirable consequences result from governmental units'
lack of express statutory authority to enter into IRSAs or from a bald
authorization to enter into IRSAs without adequate guidelines, over-
sight and review.164 First, a court may decide that a governmental unit
acted ultra vires of its statutory powers by entering into IRSAs; sec-
ond, governmental units that do not enter into IRSAs when appropri-
ate because they lack express authority, lose significant opportunities
to improve management of their assets and liabilities and to reduce
their cost of capital; and third, governmental units that enter into IR-
SAs without adequate oversight and review may use IRSAs for specu-
lative purposes or may enter into poorly structured IRSAs.
A. The Ultra Vires Threat
An IRSA is an executory contract.165 It requires an offer, accept-
ance, consideration from both counterparties and performance, in-
cluding the payment of money in the future according to the IRSA's
terms and conditions. 66 A standard condition contained in IRSAs is
that illegality will cause the IRSA to be void. 67 Thus, a fundamental
problem between IRSA counterparties arises when one of the
counterparties is not legally authorized to enter into the IRSA. 16 In
the case of an IRSA with a governmental unit, the IRSA may termi-
nate prematurely if the governmental unit lacks the statutory author-
162. See infra notes 173-207 and accompanying text.
163. Group of Thirty, supra note 15, at 7-24.
164. See supra notes 152-63 and accompanying text.
165. McGavin, supra note 9, at 221.
166. Id.
167. The Effect of Interest Rate Swaps on the Evaluation of Municipal Credit, supra
note 21, at 6.
168. I&
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ity to enter into an IRSA in the first place. 169 Termination of an IRSA
for illegality can expose a governmental unit to added costs.170 It can
also expose the governmental unit's counterparty to losses. There-
fore, it is imperative that each governmental unit and its putative
counterparty properly assess whether the governmental unit is legally
authorized to enter into the IRSA.'7 '
Because IRSAs involving governmental units are a fairly recent de-
velopment, "little jurisprudence can be found that addresses the legal-
ity of swaps or any of the other matters relevant to the enforcement of
swaps."' 7 Thus, for the time being, the leading jurisprudential answer
169. Hu, supra note 5, at 1487.
170. Rao & Hassan, supra note 21, at 94-95.
171. Clear legislative authorization to enter into swap contracts is only part of the
ultra vires avoidance story for municipal players. Investment banks and their govern-
mental counterparties also must review carefully each governmental unit's statutory
limitations on the amount of debt the governmental unit can incur. See Webster &
Sheffield Pub. Fin. Newsl., Interest Rate Swap Agreements in the Municipal Market
1, 4 (Nov. 1990). For example, in some jurisdictions, a governmental unit's IRSAs
may be treated as long-term contractual obligations that are subject to debt limita-
tions. Id. at 4. However, some other jurisdictions may allow governmental units to
avoid these debt limitations if the IRSA-related obligations are paid from special
funds or current general revenues. I Thus, there are different legal issues depending
upon whether the IRSA represents a general obligation contract or whether the
IRSA payments are "secured by a specific stream of revenues." Id.
Investors and their governmental partners should also be aware that state procure-
ment statutes may be broad and ambiguous enough to encompass IRSAs. See McGa-
vin, supra note 9, at 228. These procurement statutes may require governmental units
to publish notices of their intent to enter into particular IRSAs, to publicly bid IRSAs
prior to award or to make an effort to award IRSAs to disadvantaged or minority
businesses. Id. If the debt restrictions are exceeded or if the required procurement
procedures are not followed, an IRSA may be also repudiated as procedurally ultra
vires, Ld.
172. Shahir Guindi, Hazell v. Council of the London Borough of Hammersmith
and Fulham and Others, 25 Int'l L. 1031, 1031 (1991).
"[N]o United States court has yet determined whether a party's lack of authority
can be used to shield that party from its obligations [with respect to derivative trans-
actions]." Joanne Medero et aL, Investing in Derivatives: Current Litigation Issues,
Insights, Nov. 1994, at 4, 8. Recently, however, a community college district in Illinois
commenced an action in federal court to rescind certain investments it had entered
into, asserting, among other things, that its treasurer had acted ultra vires of his au-
thority by entering into an agreement to purchase the securities at issue. I, at 7. In
September of 1994, however, the district court granted defendant Westcap Securities'
motion to compel arbitration of the dispute concerning whether Westeap Securities
sold investments to the college district that the college district was unauthorized to
purchase. Community College Dist. No. 508 v. Westcap Gov't Sec., Inc., 1994 WL
530849, at *6, 7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 1994). Addressing the college district's assertion
that the purchases should be rescinded because the treasurer was not legally author-
ized to invest in the securities at issue, the court concluded that this argument "fo-
cus[ed] incorrectly on the end result of [the treasurer's] actions as opposed to"
whether the treasurer was authorized to enter into an agreement with Westcap Securi-
ties to purchase securities generally. Il at *6. The court held that the treasurer had
authority to enter into the agreement with Westcap Securities to purchase securities in
general and that the issue of "[w]hether Westcap fraudulently induced [the treasurer]
into investing in securities which were not safe investments for the type of institution
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to questions concerning legal authority to enter into IRSAs lies in the
1991 decision of the United Kingdom's highest court, the House of
Lords, in Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough
Council.7 3 The issue in Hammersmith was whether a municipality
had the requisite legal authority to engage in IRSAs.174 Although the
counterparties to the municipality's IRSAs had "engaged in compre-
hensive cross-checks with lawyers and other responsible authorities to
confirm that the swap dealings were lawful," 1 "5 the House of Lords
held that they were not. 76
The Council of the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham
began entering into IRSAs in December of 1983.177 By February of
1989, the council had entered into 592 swaps, 297 of which were out-
standing at the time of appeal.' 78 The notional value of all 592 swap
contracts was approximately $10.2 billion. 179 The notional value of
the 297 outstanding transactions was approximately $5 billion.18 0 The
council's actual borrowings, as of March 1989, were approximately
$660 million.181 "Arguably," one commentator has stated, "The
[c]ouncil only needed to enter into swap contracts equal to, at most,
the amount of their borrowings ... in order to protect themselves
against adverse interest rate movements."18s But, the council had en-
tered into IRSAs that, in total, were fifteen times greater than the
amount necessary to hedge its debt. 83
In comparison to other authorities, the number of IRSAs entered
into by the council was thought to be excessive.1 4 The House of
Lords noted that only ten of the 450 other United Kingdom authori-
[the treasurer] represented is a question for the arbitrator," not the court. Id. A
similar action has been filed by the County Commissioners of Charles County, Mary-
land, in September of 1994 against various broker-dealers. County Commissioners of
Charles County, Maryland v. Liberty Capital Markets, Inc., No. DKC 94-CV-2188 (D.
Md. filed Sept. 2, 1994). Medero, supra, at 7, 8 n.24. In this action, the plaintiffs assert
that the county treasurer, who had "invested 98 percent of the county's investments in
volatile derivatives" (Aaron Pressman, Can it Happen Here?, Empire St. Rep., Apr.
1995, at 44, 47), lacked the legal authority to enter into the various derivatives at issue
and that the "transactions were ultra vires and void a[b] initio." Medro, supra, at 8.
A decision has not yet been rendered in this case.
173. 2 W.L.R. 372 (1991).
174. Id. at 377.
175. Adam R. Waldman, OTC Derivatives & Systemic Risk.- Innovative Finance or
the Dance into the Abyss?, 43 Am. U. L. Rev. 1023, 1043 n.139 (citing Philip Moore,
Cleaning Up the Town Hall Mess, Euromoney, Apr. 1991, at 31).
176. Hammersmith, 2 W.L.R. at 390.
177. Id. at 377.
178. Id. at 380-381.
179. Dan Fischer, WPPSS and Hammersmith: Increased Credit Risk Protection Re-
sulting from Unprecedented Defaults, 9 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 513, 526 (1992).
180. Id. at 526.
181. Id
182. Id at 526 n.69.
183. Id.
184. Hammersmith, 2 W.L.R. at 381.
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ties had entered into more than ten swaps during the period from 1987
to 1989, and only eighteen had entered into more than five. 1as It was
apparent that the council, in contrast to most other authorities, had
engaged in financial transactions "well beyond normal debt-manage-
ment procedures."' 1 6 The House of Lords apparently adduced that
the council had not engaged in the IRSAs to reduce the costs of bor-
rowing or to hedge against changing interest rates.1" Rather, the Law
Lords believed the council participated in the IRSAs for purely specu-
lative purposes-the hope of realizing financial gains by accurately
forecasting changes in interest rates and using those profits to de-
crease debt-service costs.1as
The House of Lords had to determine whether the council was em-
powered to enter into any type of swap agreement.189 To resolve this
issue, the Law Lords reviewed the council's source of power, the Lo-
cal Government Act of 1972 .110 Under the 1972 Act, the council was
expressly authorized to engage in" 'borrowing or lending of money or
the acquisition or disposal of any property or rights[ ] which is calcu-
lated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to, the discharge of any
of their functions.' "91 The House of Lords opined that local authori-
ties subject to the provisions of the 1972 Act have only those powers
enumerated in the 1972 Act or othervise granted by Parliament.' 92
The Law Lords unanimously concluded that "a local authority [sub-
ject to the provisions of the 1972 Act] has no [express] power to enter
into a swap transaction."' 93
While the council's counterparties conceded that the council had
"no express power" to enter into swap transactions, they argued that
the council possessed such "implied power." 19 The House of Lords,
then, had to determine whether the IRSAs were" 'calculated to facili-
tate, or [were] conducive or incidental to,' the discharge" of the coun-
185. Id at 380.
186. Nicholas Bray, A British Switch on "Swaps" Puts Banks in Uproar, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 21, 1991, at A14.
187. Hammersmith, 2 W.L.R. at 383.
188. Idl at 380.
189. Id. at 377.
190. Iad at 373, 382-83.
191. Itt at 383 (quoting § 111(1) of the 1972 Act).
192. Id- at 383; see also Guindi, supra note 172 (discussing whether Hammersmith
was correctly decided and identifying factors that may have influenced the Law Lords
in their decision, including the notion that the House of Lords may have wanted to
defer to Parliament on whether local boroughs should be empowered to enter into
IRSAs, noting that Parliament had granted certain other governmental entities ex-
press authority to enter into IRSAs); Hammersmith, 2 W.L.R at 389 ("It is for Parlia-
ment and not the courts to decide whether there should be conferred on local
authorities unlimited power to hedge or a power limited for the protection of the
taxpayers and ratepayers.").
193. Hammersmith at 390.
194. 1& at 382.
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cil's authorized power and function of borrowing.' The Law Lords
held that the IRSAs neither "facilitate[d]" nor were "conducive" to
borrowing' 96 because the council's strategy-entering into swaps with
the hope of financial profit-impermissibly contravened the council's
"duty to act prudently in the interests of the ratepayers."'197
The Law Lords then considered whether IRSAs might be "inciden-
tal to" borrowing in spite of the fact that an IRSA could be entered
into years after a borrowing transaction.' 98 "[A] power," the House
of Lords held, however, "is not incidental merely because it is conve-
nient or desirable or profitable.' 99 The House of Lords also rejected
the banks' argument that IRSAs were "incidental to the function of
debt management."' 00 "Debt management," the Law Lords found,
"describes prudent and lawful activities," '' not unlawful ones. If en-
tering into the transactions was unlawful, then doing so could not be
characterized as debt management. 2  Thus, all 592 IRSAs that the
council had entered into were ultra vires of the powers of the council
and therefore illegal."0 3
The decision did not address how the ultra vires finding would im-
pact the parties in the case. The House of Lords merely observed that
its ultra vires finding did not necessarily mean that the banks would be
unable to recover against the borough.2°  Rather, the consequences
of each transaction would have to be reviewed on a case-by-case
basis.z05
Thus, in Hammersmith, the House of Lords, in a strict interpreta-
tion of the laws applicable to the council, written well before IRSAs
were ever conceived, concluded that the council lacked either express
or implied power to enter into IRSAs and left open the question of
the impact of its ultra vires finding on the parties.20 6 The legal battle
over who will absorb the losses between the council and its IRSA
counterparties is trudging on in British courts."°
195. Id. at 383 (quoting § 111(1) of the 1972 Act).
196. See id. at 383-84.
197. Id. at 383.
198. Id. at 384.
199. Id at 385.
200. Id. at 388.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id at 390, 392.
204. Id. at 389-90.
205. Id at 390.
206. "The counterparties can claim restitutionary remedies, but these are uncertain
in their scope." Canby, supra note 66, at 421.
207. Credit Commercial de France "is the latest to seek damages from the govern-
ment of Hammersmith and Fulham." French Bank Sues British City for Fraud, Am.
Banker, Jan. 13, 1994, at 6. "Chemical Banking Corp., for example, sued the city in
1992." Id Credit Commercial de France said that it is "seeking restitution of sums
paid to Hammersmith and Fulham" as well as "the recognition of the fraud commit-
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Given the absence of case law on this issue in the United States, it is
possible that a court may look to Hammersmith for guidance if it must
decide whether a governmental unit in the United States acted ultra
vires of its statutory authority by entering into IRSAs. In the United
States, the ultra vires doctrine, as it relates to state and local govern-
mental units, is the "well-established" principle that dictates that as
"creatures of the State," state and local governmental units
can exercise only that power which the legislature has conferred
upon them. The authority of municipalities has been described as:
(1) the powers granted in express terms; (2) those necessarily
or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted;
and (3) those essential to the accomplishment of the declared
objects of the corporation-not simply convenient, but only
those which are indispensable, to the accomplishment of the
declared objects of the corporation. 1
Thus, acts of state and local governmental units are ultra vires when
they are beyond the express, incidental or implied powers conferred
upon them by the state or are not essential to the fulfillment of their
legislatively declared objectives.
These principles were at issue in a highly publicized case involving
the "largest municipal bond default in history."2' 9 At issue in Chemi-
cal Bank v. Washington Public Power Supply System 210 was whether
the holders of $2.25 billion worth of revenue bonds issued by the
Washington Public Power Supply System between 1977 and 1981
would be repaid,2 1 with interest, for a total of $7.2 billion.212 The
WPPSS court, in a narrow construction of applicable Washington stat-
utes, held that the bondholders were not entitled to restitution be-
cause WPPSS had neither express nor implied statutory authority to
enter into the agreements by which the bonds were issued. 13
WPPSS, a joint operating agency and municipal corporation com-
prised of nineteen public utility districts and nine cities, was empow-
ered, among other things, to acquire, construct, operate and own
ted by Hammersmith and Fulham, which made false statements to CCF with regard to
its.ability to perform such swaps." Id
208. Bowers v. City of High Point, 451 S.E.2d 284, 287-88 (N.C. 1994).
209. Fischer, supra note 179, at 513.
210. 691 P.2d 524 (Wash. 1984).
211. The results of a default are different depending on the type of bond issued:
When the source of repayment of a bond is limited to a specified fund, the
bond is a revenue bond. The "special fund" is defined by the revenues set
aside for the repayment of the indebtedness. A toll bridge, for example, is
likely to be financed with revenue bonds repayable solely from the tolls col-
lected at the bridge. In the event toll revenues are insufficient to pay debt
service, bondholders have no recourse against the general assets of the polit-
ical subdivision in which the toll bridge is situated.
Robert A. Fippinger, The Securities Law of Public Finance 9 (1988).
212. Fischer, supra note 179, at 514-18.
213. See WPPSS, 691 P.2d at 536.
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plants and related facilities for the purpose of generating or transmit-
ting electrical power. 14 In 1976, WPPSS and eighty-eight other gov-
ernmental units signed participation agreements to obtain financing to
construct two nuclear power plants.2 15 The participation agreements
conferred upon the participants various rights, interests and obliga-
tions in the power plants to be constructed.1 6 In accordance with the
participation agreements, WPPSS issued $2.25 billion in bonds.2 17
When enormous cost overruns occurred, WPPSS terminated the two
construction projects prior to completion.21 s Many of the participants
repudiated their obligations under the participation agreements.219
The bondholders' trustee then sought a declaratory judgment that
WPPSS was obligated to make payments to the bondholders and that
the participants were bound under the agreements to make payments
to WPPSS for their respective shares of the debt service owed on the
bonds.220
The WPPSS court, however, found that the twenty-eight govern-
mental units comprising WPPSS exceeded their statutory authority to
purchase electricity or own power plants because the participation
agreements, among other things, required the participants to guaran-
tee bond payments "irrespective of whether any electric current [was]
delivered"'" and to surrender ownership interest and considerable
control to WPPSS. 2 As to the remaining sixty governmental partici-
pants, the court held that they were released from their obligations
under the agreements in accordance with the doctrines of mutual mis-
take and commercial frustration.2z
In WPPSS, the court also discussed the distinction between substan-
tive ultra vires acts and procedural ultra vires acts. The general rule,
the court noted, is that
a private party, acting in good faith, may recover from a govern-
mental agency if the agency "had the power it sought to exercise but
merely ... exercised it in an irregular manner or by unauthorized
procedural means", and the action was not malum in se, malum
prohibitum or manifestly against public policy.224
The WPPSS court found that because the contracts were not for the
purpose of purchasing electricity or power plants, it was substantively
214. Id at 529 & n.1.
215. Id at 529.
216. Id
217. Id at 530.
218. Id
219. Id
220. Id
221. Id at 535.
222. Id
223. Id at 537.
224. Id at 545 (quoting Noel v. Cole, 655 P.2d 245, 250 (Wash. 1982)).
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ultra vires for WPPSS to enter into them.2  The court concluded that
neither WPPSS, which had acted ultra vires of its statutory authority,
nor the sixty participants were under any obligation to make pay-
ments to the bondholders. 6 In reaching its holding, the court re-
ferred to its previous decision in this case 7 where it had noted that
the ultra vires doctrine "applies to government action to 'protect the
citizens and taxpayers... from unjust, ill-considered, or extortionate
contracts, or those showing favoritism.' "I The participation agree-
ments, the court noted in its earlier decision, did not adequately pro-
tect the ratepayers whom the governmental participants were
supposed to represent." 9 By relying on the participation agreement
scheme instead of on the legislative scheme that incorporated protec-
tions for the ratepayers, the governmental units acted ultra vires of
their statutory authority, thus rendering the bondholder contracts
void.230
Given the holdings in Hammersmith and WPPSS, a putative
counterparty to an IRSA with a governmental unit should insure that
the governmental unit: (1) has statutory authority to enter into the
IRSA; (2) wants to enter into the IRSA for debt management and not
speculative purposes; and (3) where authority to enter into IRSAs is
arguably ambiguous, provides legal opinions that demonstrate that re-
liance on other statutory powers is clearly warranted."
B. The Implicit "Gamble"
Governmental units that lack express statutory authority to engage
in IRSAs or whose authority is ambiguous also may be less likely to
learn how IRSAs work and to investigate whether they could benefit
their jurisdictions. Other governmental units that do possess the ex-
pertise required to structure and use IRSAs effectively may be reluc-
tant to enter into them absent express statutory authority. In either
event, the result can be lost opportunities to minimize risk and reduce
costs. Furthermore, when governmental units could derive benefits
from entering into IRSAs but are precluded from doing so because
they lack statutory authority to use IRSAs, state legislatures effec-
225. Id The trustee asserted that WPPSS possessed broad statutory power to con-
tract for the purchase of electric and power plants and that its only error WPPSS
made was failing to specify clearly in the participation agreements "sufficient owner-
ship interest to protect ratepayers." Id.
226. Id.
227. Chemical Bank v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 666 P.2d 329 (Wash.
1983).
228. Id at 342 (quoting 10 E. McQuillin, Mun. Corp. § 29.02, at 200 (3d ed. 1981)).
229. Id
230. Id.
231. See Thomas A. McGavin, Jr., Presentation Before the Municipal Swap Confer-
ence: Understanding Local Law Requirements Governing the Execution of Interest
Rate Swaps 5, 8 (1990) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
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tively force governmental units to "gamble" unnecessarily with public
resources. Such governmental units also may be needlessly exposed
to increased interest-rate risk and costs.
The Joint Surveys revealed that thirty-six percent of the respon-
dents believe derivative products are too risky, and thirty-eight per-
cent said they are too complex.321 Only four percent of the
respondents identified themselves as "being very knowledgeable
about derivative products," and only twenty percent said they "knew
the basics. ' '233 The Joint Surveys also found that "even though deriva-
tive products were used by issuers in twenty-five states, more than
one-third of the users were in California and Florida." 4 In 1987,
these two states granted governmental units within their jurisdictions
express statutory authority to enter into IRSAs and other types of
derivative transactions .35 Based on the Joint Surveys results, it ap-
pears that there may be a positive correlation between the existence
of express statutory authorization to engage in IRSAs and the use of
IRSAs by governmental units. If this correlation is established, it may
also suggest that when governmental units have express authority to
engage in IRSAs, they are more motivated to learn about how IRSAs
work and to investigate whether the use of IRSAs might benefit their
jurisdictions.
The general lack of knowledge relating to IRSAs also may be the
result of an aversion to derivatives among government fiscal officers.
Such aversion likely is exacerbated by the recent plethora of bad press
about derivatives generally. Headlines such as "Auburn, Maine, An-
nounces Losses From Derivatives, ''23 6 "Greenwood County, S.C.,
Treasurer Quits After Fund Suffers Derivatives Losses," 37 and a pop-
ular business magazine's cover story on derivatives titled, "The Risk
That Won't Go Away" 238 do little to inform and much to intimidate,
as do comments by legislators such as, "You can call it whatever you
232. Joint Surveys, supra note 24, at 15.
233. Id at 15.
234. Id
235. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
236. Patrick M. Fitzgibbons, Auburn, Maine, Announces Losses from Derivatives,
Bond Buyer, Dec. 9, 1994, at 1. The city of Auburn, Maine, "had funds invested in
derivatives, zero-coupon bonds, Treasury strips, and some stocks." Id. at 1, 5. Patricia
A. Finnigan, acting city manager, stated: "'This problem was the result of a lack of
oversight and an incompetent investment policy.'" Id at 5.
237. Donald Yacoe, Greenwood County, S.C., Treasurer Quits After Fund Suffers
Derivatives Losses, Bond Buyer, Dec. 15, 1994, at 1. Greenwood County's treasurer
had invested heavily in "collateralized mortgage obligations and other derivatives
[that] contribut[ed] to unrealized losses of about $3 million in fiscal 1994" out of an
$8.4 million trust fund. The county council immediately "voted unanimously to im-
plement a system of controls on the fund, including appointment of an investment
committee to monitor the fund's performance at least quarterly." Id.
238. Carol J. Loomis, The Risk That Won't Go Away, Fortune, Mar. 7, 1994, at 40
(containing a magazine cover featuring a close-up of an alligator's gaping jaw with the
requisite rows of sharp, huge teeth engulfing the sub-headline, "FINANCIAL DE-
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want, but in my book it's gambling." 9 Upon closer examination,
however, it is clear that fiscal mismanagement, exacerbated by the ab-
sence of proper oversight and control, rather than IRSAs, or deriva-
tives per se, is the root cause of most of the losses that have received
widespread negative media attention.m°
"'[fIn the current environment,'" noted one government official,
"'there is a risk that the pendulum is swinging too far toward a kind
of false fiscal conservatism.' "' In other words, a risk exists that pub-
lic finance officials, acting under the guise of responsible fiscal man-
agement, will elect not to enter into IRSAs, even when it is fiscally
prudent.
Other governmental units that possess the required expertise and
resources to enter into IRSAs may be reluctant to engage in these
transactions without express statutory authority. The State of New
York Metropolitan Transportation Authority,242 for example, has
never executed an IRSA. The MTA, however, tried, unsuccessfully,
for the last several years to convince the New York State Legislature
to enact legislation expressly authorizing it to enter into IRSAs as well
as various other types of derivative contracts. 43 One of the MTA's
more immediate objectives has been to use IRSAs to help "eliminate
RIVATIVES are tightening their grip on the world economy. And nobody knows
how to control them").
239. Silber, supra note 84, at 12 (comment by Henry B. Gonzalez, then-chairman of
the House Banking Committee, made at a hearing on derivatives trading held in Oc-
tober 1994.)
240. "All of the dozens of problems that were revealed [in 1994) fit into that specu-
lative category: betting that interest rates would remain stable while taking on a huge
risk of losses if they rose." Saul Hansell, Derivatives Draw More Scrutiny, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 3, 1995, at C39.
241. Morrison, PSA's President, supra note 22, at 3 (quoting Heather Ruth, former
President of the Public Securities Association).
242. The MTA is responsible, among other things, for securing funding for bridge
and tunnel, subway, bus and commuter rail operations in the New York metropolitan
region provided by the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, the New York City
Transit Authority, the Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Authority, The Long
Island Rail Road Company, the Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company and the
Metropolitan Suburban Bus Authority. See Metropolitan Transportation Authority,
1993 Annual Report 33, 56 (1994).
243. Hume, supra note 40, at 2A, 6A. The City of New York as well as the MTA
have been unable to convince state legislators that IRSAs' benefits can be substantial.
Id In 1991, for example, the MTA was unable even to obtain
approval from the New York governor's counsel to go to the Legislature
with proposals to allow it to enter into interest rate and commodity swaps.
"What probably killed us was that we tried to go for the kitchen sink," said
Edward Armendariz, [former] director of finance for the MTA. He said the
authority will try again but will limit its legislative proposals to interest rate
swaps, which got a better reception than commodity swaps from the lawyers.
Id. In 1995, the MTA again sought statutory approval to enter into fixed-to-floating-
rate IRSAs to help close an annual drain on its budget of S26 million, informing state
legislators that the " 'MTA is interested in pursuing the use of derivatives as a means
of reducing our exposure, not increasing our risk.'" Michael Moss & David Henry,
MTA Seeks OK for Derivatives Deal, N.Y. Newsday, Jan. 25, 1995, at A33 (quoting
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a $26 million average annual drain caused by a mismatch in the $1
billion the MTA borrows at higher long-term rates but invests at lower
short-term rates for just a few months, until it is spent." 4 Had the
MTA possessed express statutory authority to enter into IRSAs over
the last two years, it could have realized savings of approximately $52
million.245 The MTA has estimated that the cost of a subway ride
could decrease by five cents for every $55 million that the MTA
saves.
24 6
As indicated by this example, state legislators impose on the public
definite, measurable costs when they fail to ensure that the use of pub-
lic funds is maximized and protected against unnecessary risks and
costs. Rather than permitting governmental units to have access to
more financial tools, tools that the private sector uses regularly, state
legislators have made a decision to continue to allow governmental
units to take implicit gambles with public resources. The implicit gam-
ble, in the case of the MTA, for example, is a decision to allow the
MTA's investment portfolio to go unhedged in the hope that short-
term interest rates will rise and not decline. In the MTA's case, this
gamble has not paid off. New York State's legislators' failure to give
the MTA express statutory authority to enter into IRSAs has cost tax-
payers and consumers tens of millions of dollars in the last few years
alone.
C. Increased Exposure to Operational Risk
In addition to expressly authorizing governmental units to enter
into IRSAs, as several states have already done, state legislatures
must establish a comprehensive system of oversight and control of
governmental units' use of IRSAs. As one commentator has ob-
served, many of the problems involving governmental units' derivative
investments largely stem from the fact that legislation governing gov-
ernmental units has "lagged behind the rapid development of the de-
rivatives market. 247
Thus, even if a governmental unit's IRSA were to survive an ultra
vires challenge, there is a risk that reliance on existing statutes could
result in increased operational risks.248 A number of existing statutes,
for example, authorize governmental units to incur debt, enter into
contracts and generally do what is necessary to achieve their respec-
MTA Executive Director Jay Walder). The New York State Legislature has not yet
acted on the MTA's proposed legislation.
244. Moss & Henry, supra note 243, at A33.
245. Id.
246. MTA Fimance Committee, Agenda Item B: 1995 Budget Continuing Resolu-
tion and Contingency Programs B-71 (Jan. 23, 1995) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
247. Canby, supra note 66, at 421.
248. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
2210 [Vol. 63
SWAP AGREEMENTS
tive legislative purposes."5 But, many of these statutes were enacted
long before any legislator could have contemplated their use by gov-
ernmental units in connection with the contemporary array of com-
plex financial vehicles.?5 ° Such statutes, therefore, are not likely to
require the types of reporting, oversight and review necessary to man-
age successfully today's complex transactions. Even more recently en-
acted statutes expressly authorizing governmental units to enter into
IRSAs and similar transactions often fail adequate reporting, over-
sight and review. 5 1 In either case, the result, as appears to be the case
in Orange County, California, could be increased operational risks
and significant financial losses.
On December 6, 1994, Orange County, California, and the Orange
County Investment Pool filed for bankruptcy protection under Chap-
ter 9 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, governing municipal
bankruptcies.5 2  With these filings, it was reported that Orange
County, the fifth-largest county in the United States in population, 53
"became the largest municipality ever to file for Federal bankruptcy
protection."'-' The bankruptcy filings were precipitated by a liquidity
crisis resulting from the inability of the pool's treasurer to renew a $2
billion loan made to the pool by CS First Boston and from CS First
Boston's decision to sell $2.1 billion it held as collateral.5 The pool,
with assets estimated at $7.5 billion, 56 suffered paper losses, of $2
billion in 1994.58 Although county officials initially blamed rising in-
terest rates and derivatives for the pool's troubles,2 5 9 it appears that
an overly aggressive investment strategy, coupled with a lack of over-
sight and controls, were at the root of the pool's problems?'
Details concerning causes and ramifications of the Orange County
bankruptcies are still unfolding. Based on extant press reports, it ap-
249. McGavin, supra note 9, at 220-23.
250. Group of Thirty, supra note 15, at 51.
251. See infra notes 298-301, 337-47, and accompanying text.
252. See David L. Dubrow, Five Aspects of Municipal Bankruptcy That Will Be
Crucial to Orange County, Bond Buyer, Dec. 12, 1994, at 9; Yacoe, supra note 237, at
19.
253. Leslie Wayne, Orange County Can Meet Only 60% of Its Budget, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 5, 1995, at Al.
254. Seth Mydans, Shock and Confusion in Offices and Streets, N.Y. Tumes, Dee. 8,
1994, at D17.
255. Sallie Hofmeister, A Default By Orange County: Firms Face Lawsuits over
Collateral Sales, N.Y. Tunes, Dec. 9, 1994, at D1, D5.
256. Sharon R. King & Brad Altman, Orange County, Calif., Says Investment Pool
Took $1.5 Billion Hit, Bond Buyer, Dec. 2, 1994, at 24.
257. A "paper" loss is an "unrealized [loss] on a security or other investment still
held." Black's Law Dictionary 1111 (6th ed. 1990). A loss is "realized... only upon
the sale of the security." Id.
258. Orange County Officials May Defer Payments, N.Y. Tunes, Jan. 14,1995, at 49.
259. Michael Utley & Brad Altman, Orange County, Calif., Treasurer Resigns over
Investment Pool, Bond Buyer, Dec. 6, 1994, at 1.
260. Sam Roberts, When Government Plays Entrepreneur, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11,
1994, at 1, 16.
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pears that the pool's losses were the result of a variety of factors, in-
cluding: (1) the treasurer's strategy of using certain investment
vehicles to speculate with the hope of financial gain and borrowing
heavily to make additional investments;261 (2) the county supervisors'
apparent failure to inform themselves of the treasurer's investments
and strategy;2 62 and (3) the flaws in the state's laws that expressly au-
thorize certain investments in derivatives but lack appropriate over-
sight mechanisms and controls.263 This toxic combination created a
situation that permitted "'a public official [to] gamble a government
into bankruptcy.' "264
The Orange County Investment Pool is managed by five elected of-
ficials who comprise the Board of Supervisors, the entity responsible
for overseeing the activities of the county treasurer.265 In addition to
the county itself, investors in the pool include 186 cities, school dis-
tricts and transportation and sanitation agencies both in Orange
County and elsewhere in the state.266 Orange County, the largest in-
vestor in the pool, held about one-third of the pool's assets.267 The
majority of the remaining two-thirds came from funds invested by
other governmental units that were required to invest their extra reve-
nues in the pool.268
With respect to the county's investment strategy, the treasurer ap-
pears to have made two serious mistakes. First, the treasurer invested
sixty percent of the pool's assets in derivatives known as "structured
notes, consisting primarily of inverse floaters '269 issued by the Federal
National Mortgage Association (known as "Fannie Mae") and the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (known as "Freddie
Mac").27 0 An inverse floater "combine[s] the features of an ordinary
261. The pool, for example, had borrowings of approximately $13 billion, well in
excess of state law limiting borrowings to the size of the pool's annual revenues of
$1.5 billion. Leslie Wayne, Orange County in Suit Against Merrill Lynch, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 13, 1995, at D2. Furthermore, the borrowings that the treasurer used to leverage
the pool's size, "were used for speculation and not simply to 'supplement income,'
which is the only use permitted by California law." Id. (quoting James W. Mercer, a
lawyer representing Orange County, California).
262. Dan Weikel & Matt Lait, Complexity of Debacle Hamstrings Supervisors, L.A.
Times, Dec. 11, 1994, at Al, A46.
263. See infra notes 298-301 and accompanying text.
264. Roberts, supra note 260, at 16 (quoting Felix G. Rohatyn, "the investment
banker whose creativity helped rescue New York City from the brink of bankruptcy in
the 1970's").
265. Weikel & Lait, supra note 262, at A46.
266. Flanigan, supra note 129, at D1; Leslie Wayne, County's Crisis is Conserva-
tives' Lab: A California Test of Less Government, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1995, at D1.
267. Wayne, supra note 253, at Dl.
268. Leslie Wayne, $1.5 Billion Loss Seen for Orange County; Orange, Calif., Hurt
as Derivatives Drop, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1994, at D1, D16.
269. Michael Utley, Orange County Adviser Says Loss by Troubled Fund is $2 Bil-
lion, Bond Buyer, Dec. 14, 1994, at 1.
270. Search Warrants are Issued in the Orange County Fiasco, N.Y. Times, Dec. 20,
1994, at D8.
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fixed-rate bond with an interest-rate swap." '271 The interest paid on
these structured notes moves inversely to market rates; as interest
rates fall, they pay more interest, and as interest rates rise, they pay
less."~ These investments are considered risky because as interest
rates rise, their value falls and the interest they earn also drops.273
According to S&P, governmental units should limit their exposure to
derivatives to no more than fifteen percent to twenty percent of their
portfolios.274 Most of the governmental units that have experienced
significant losses from derivative investments were the ones that did
not invest wisely in derivatives and "based as much as 90% of their
portfolio on derivatives.""7 5
The treasurer's decision to invest sixty percent of the pool's assets
in inverse floaters put the portfolio in a position well in excess of the
recommended exposure to derivatives. Furthermore, these invest-
ments fared poorly in two ways in a rising interest-rate environment:
(1) their value declined and (2) the interest the pool earned on these
investments also fell.
Second, it appears that losses tied to the inverse floaters were exac-
erbated by the treasurer's decision to borrow heavily through the use
of reverse repurchase agreements ("reverse repos") to make addi-
tional investments. In 1979, the county treasurer, who was then the
head of the California association of county treasurers, drafted a
change to state law that permitted county treasurers to borrow money
through the use of reverse repos.276 In a reverse repo, a borrower
gives a lender assets, such as United States government securities, in
return for a loan.2" The borrower then agrees to repurchase the as-
sets pledged as collateral on a preset date at an agreed price.Y8 If the
value of the collateral falls, the borrower must post additional collat-
eral to cover the amount of the outstanding loan balance.2 79 The
county treasurer used these agreements to borrow approximately $13
billion.280 The proceeds were used to purchase about $13.5 billion of
investments for the pool.281 Then, investments held by the pool were
271. Saul Hansell, Wall St's Rescue Squads Also Turn a 7idy Profit, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 20, 1994, at D8, chart.
272. Id.
273. 1i
274. Morrison, Derivatives Transactions, supra note 22, at 7.
275. 1&
276. Sallie Hofmeister, A Strategy's Creator Also Drafted the Law, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 8, 1994, at D17; see also 1979 Cal. Stat. 158, (codified at Cal. Gov't Code
§§ 53601, 53635 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995)) (authorizing investments in reverse repur-
chase agreements).
277. Andrew Garvey & Scott Fairclough, Lehman Brothers Mun. Market Rev., The
Mechanics of the Orange County Bankruptcy 6 (First Quarter, 1995).
278. Id.
279. Id
280. Id.
281. Id.
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used to collateralize the reverse repos.21 While this strategy per-
formed well when interest rates were falling,13 as interest rates began
to rise in 1993, and the market value of the collateral fell, the pool had
to use cash reserves to post additional collateral for the balance of the
reverse repos' terms." Eventually, the pool became insolvent, and
the lenders began to sell the collateral they held to recover the out-
standing loan balances3. 85
Merrill Lynch & Company, one of the investment banks that had
entered into reverse repos with the pool, asserts that in 1992, it
warned the treasurer about the increased risks in the pool and even
"offered to buy back at a profit to the fund all the derivative securities
that Merrill had sold to it.'' 286 The treasurer, Merrill Lynch alleges,
"declined Merrill's offer, saying that he was aware of the volatile na-
ture of the fund's investments. ''2 87
Acting Treasury Secretary Frank N. Newman summed up the Or-
ange County situation by noting that the pool's financial troubles were
caused by an improper investment strategy, not by its investment in
derivatives per se. The pool, Mr. Newman observed, " 'purchased
long-term securities with short-term loans,'" and when short-term in-
terest rates climbed, the pool assets declined.2s The levels and types
of investments, as well as the level of borrowing involved, strongly
suggest that the pool did not use derivatives as a tool for hedging
against the risks associated with changes in interest rates, but rather as
a means of speculating with the hope of realizing gains. By borrowing
heavily through the use of reverse repos, and continuing to do so in a
rising interest-rate environment, the pool became locked in a cash-
draining, downward spiral which left it with no other option but to file
for federal bankruptcy protection.
282. Sallie Hofmeister, Finger-Pointing in Orange County Fiasco: Wall Street Firms
are Subpoenaed and Sued on Fund, N.Y. Tines, Dec. 10, 1994, at 39, 49.
The official statement for a $64 million tax-exempt note issue sold [by the
county] last August... contain[ed] a section on the county's investment pool
that said the pool contained derivatives as well as fixed- and floating-rate
securities, a "significant portion" of which "are pledged with respect to re-
purchase agreements."
Lynn S. Hume & Joanne Morrison, California County's Disclosures May Not Have
Followed Securities Laws, Bond Buyer, Dec. 8, 1994, at 1, 9.
283. During the county fiscal year ending June 30, 1993, the pool earned 8.52% on
its investments, compared to earnings of 4.71% in the State of California Treasury
investment pool during the same period. Garvey & Fairclough, supra note 277, at 6.
284. King & Altman, supra note 256, at 24.
285. Garvey & Fairclough, supra note 277, at 8. In addition, as Jon Lukomnik,
Deputy Comptroller for Pensions for New York City, observed, the pool "had both
operating cash and pension funds mixed together, though the investment strategies
for each should be completely different." Hevesi, supra note 40, at 2.
286. Laurence Zuckerman, Merrill Cites Warning to Big County: Letters Urged
Caution on Investment Fund, N.Y. Tunes, Jan. 11, 1995, at D1.
287. Id at D7.
288. Keith Bradsher, Regulators See No Need for Tougher Rules on Derivatives,
N.Y. Tines, Jan. 6, 1995, at D12.
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In addition, the Orange County Board of Supervisors were appar-
ently unaware of the magnitude of the pool's problems.28 9 The mem-
bers of the Board of Supervisors29 were far from knowledgeable
about reverse repos and inverse floaters.291 The Chairman of the
Board of Supervisors "admitt[ed] that much of the county's economic
problems are beyond his comprehension." 2' A local political activist
stated: "'It would be incredible malfeasance if the board didn't make
themselves aware of the investments [the treasurer] was making [be-
cause t]hey have a central role to make sure the money was invested
properly.' "293 Surprisingly, however, "the supervisors contend that
they should not be held responsible for the crisis"2 94 because the pub-
lic should not expect elected officials to be knowledgeable about these
types of investments.2 95 Another Orange County activist summed up
the attitude of the Board of Supervisors by commenting: "'They have
plenty of arrogance and no accountability.' "296 The Board of Super-
visors also has been criticized by some for failing to take corrective
action earlier after "watchdog agencies" repeatedly noted
problems z.2 1 Had the Board of Supervisors appropriately monitored
the treasurer's activities, it is possible that it would have discovered
that the treasurer's investment strategy was improper, and resulting
losses may have been minimized.
Further compounding the risks inherent in the treasurer's invest-
ment strategy are the flaws in relevant California law."98 The law
seeks to ensure that treasurers' day-to-day investment decisions are
free from interference by locally elected officials; however, the law
also permits treasurers to act with virtually no supervision. 299 The
law's oversight requirement is that the governmental unit's supervis-
ing body approve the use of reverse repos. 300 More significantly, the
law does not require the treasurer to mark periodically the pool's in-
vestments to market and to report the results to the Board of Supervi-
sors, legislators or regulatory bodies. 0 1
289. Flanigan, supra note 129, at D3.
290. A child-care expert, a former Marine, a former college professor, a former
police officer and a former mayoral aide comprised the five-person Board of Supervi-
sors at the time of the bankruptcy filings. Weikel & Lait, supra note 262, at Al, A46.
291. Id. at Al.
292. Id
293. Id. at A46 (quoting Christopher Meara, Irvine, California, attorney).
294. Id
295. Id
296. Id. (quoting Tom Rogers, an activist in southern California).
297. Id.
298. Hofmeister, supra note 276, at D17.
299. Id
300. Id; see also Cal. Gov't Code §§ 53601(i), 53635(i) (West 1983 & Supp. 1995)
(requiring that "[i]nvestment in a reverse repurchase agreement shall be made only
upon prior approval of the legislative body of the local agency").
301. Flanigan, supra note 129, at D3.
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While it is far too early to identify what all of the ramifications of
the Orange County bankruptcies will be, they are bound to include
actions such as those taken by the Saddleback Valley Unified School
District. The district had to lay off forty-seven employees to lower
costs because most of its operating funds are tied up in the Orange
County Investment Pool bankruptcy. 302 Other bankruptcies may also
result.30 3 Furthermore, many of the pool's investors, following Or-
ange County's lead, plan to commence lawsuits against the investment
banks that sold investment vehicles to the pool. 3 4 It probably will be
years before many of the pool's and county's troubles are sorted out
among all the participants. 0 5
Although the Orange County investment strategy yielded invest-
ment income for several years,30 6 it is, nevertheless, a strategy fraught
with excessive risks and an improper scheme for managing public re-
sources. Because the Orange County Investment Pool bankruptcy
highlights the fact that an overly speculative investment policy and
inadequate oversight-not derivatives per se-are at the root of the
problem, governments can begin to formulate legislation that ad-
dresses these issues.
Since the Orange County bankruptcy filings, some legislators have
rushed to draft legislation that would significantly curb or even ban
the use of derivatives by governmental units,307 noting that other simi-
lar, but relatively smaller scale, examples have occurred. 8 Many
302. County Board Promises to Guard School Funds, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1994, at
D6.
303. For example, early in December of 1994, "the small city of Montebello in Los
Angeles County disclos[ed] that it might have to file for bankruptcy because it has
more than 60 percent of its $77.2 million investment portfolio frozen in the Orange
County pool." Hofmeister, supra note 282, at 39. Montebello has, however, been able
to avoid bankruptcy for the time being. In late December, Montebello "received a
$14-million infusion from the investment pool, a key part of [its] plan to avoid de-
faulting on a $25.6-million note payment due [December 30, 1994]." Mark Platte et
al., O.C. Deficit Could Triple to $120 Million by June, L.A. Tunes, Dec. 29, 1994, Al,
A18.
304. Id.
305. John H. Allan, Not a Very Good Idea, Bond Buyer, Dec. 12, 1994, at 16.
306. In the 22-year period from July 1972, through June 1994, the Orange County
Investment Pool outperformed California's Local Agency Investment Fund in 17 of
those years. Jeff Brazil et al., Citron's Track Record Falls Short of Reputation, L.A.
Tunes, Jan. 8, 1995, at Al. During the four-year period from 1991 through 1994, the
pool "enjoyed some of the best above-market returns, but [it was also the period
when the pool] took [the] greatest risks." Id.
307. Michael Utley, California Legislation Would Prohibit Investment Practices
Used in Orange County, Bond Buyer, Dec. 9, 1994, at 2.
308. For example, in 1994, Rep. Henry Gonzalez, then-Chairman of the House
Banking Committee, noted that the credit rating of the Odessa Junior College District
in Texas was lowered after it was discovered that the district "had lost millions" from
its investments in derivatives. Texas Governor Urged to Sound Alarm on Derivatives
Risk, Bond Buyer, Sept. 14, 1994, at 2. Later in 1994, officials of the City of Auburn,
Maine, reported that the city "lost more than 40% of [its] funds that were invested in
derivatives and other securities." Fltzgibbons, supra note 236, at 1.
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others, however, urge caution, expressing concern that such legislation
"may go too far."30 While it may take less effort on the part of legis-
lators simply to prohibit governmental units from using derivatives
such as IRSAs, that clearly is not the most prudent alternative given
that IRSAs, when used and monitored properly, can save taxpayers
millions of dollars. Rather, state legislatures, in addition to expressly
authorizing certain governmental units to enter into IRSAs, should
enact a legislative scheme requiring governmental units to report ade-
quately on their use of IRSAs and establishing clear oversight func-
tions and responsibilities as well as guidelines on the appropriate
structure and use of IRSAs.
Im. IN SEARCH OF ... STATUTORY AUTHORITY
Most governmental units in the United States do not have express
statutory authority to enter into IRSAs.31 0 Despite this lack of ex-
press statutory authority, some of these same governmental units
enter into IRSAs regularly.31' Many do so by relying on their existing
powers, such as their authority to contract, manage their investments,
issue debt and generally do those things necessary to achieve their
statutory purposes. 3 2 Since 1985, a growing number of states, includ-
ing California, Florida, Nevada, New York and Utah, have given a few
or all of the governmental units in their jurisdictions express statutory
authority to engage in IRSAs as well as other derivative products. 3
While there are numerous variations between and within these two
groups-those that have express statutory authority and those that do
not-in many cases the legislation upon which they rely share a com-
mon defect: a lack of an adequate, comprehensive program for over-
sight and control of governmental units' use of derivatives.
A. Reliance on Other Grants of Power
An absence of express statutory authority does not necessarily
mean that a governmental unit is prevented from entering into IR-
SAs. 14 While specific authorization is desirable, implied authority to
309. Utley, supra note 307, at 2.
310. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
311. For example, "for several years the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey has been swapping its fixed rates into variable rates and vice versa." Moss &
Henry, supra note 243, at A33. Yet, "lilt remain[s] unclear who authorized the Port
Authority to engage in swaps, since the bi-state agency often skirts state regulations."
Id See also infra note 329 and accompanying text (discussing The City of New York's
derivative investment activities and disagreements among market participants regard-
ing the status of its legal authority to engage in derivative transactions).
312. McGavin, supra note 9, at 220-23.
313. See infra notes 334-47 and accompanying text.
314. McGavin, supra note 231, at 6. For a detailed review of the variety of ways in
which some governmental entities may find implied authority to enter into IRSAs
based on their existing statutory powers, see McGavin, supra note 9, at 220-23.
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enter into IRSAs may be found in state constitutions, governmental
units' charters and enabling legislation, as well as in court decisions
and rulings and regulations interpreting these laws.315
Most state and local governmental units have the power to execute
contracts and can exercise this power in furtherance of other govern-
mental powers and duties, such as the powers to borrow, invest and
otherwise manage their affairs.316 As a general rule, a governmental
entity possesses those powers that are expressly granted, as well as
those that are necessarily implied, but not powers that are "merely
convenient. 317 Where a governmental unit is specifically empowered
to" 'do all things necessary or convenient' for the exercise of the pow-
ers granted," however, the rule that implied powers must be necessary
and not simply convenient is not applicable. 1 Thus, the power to
enter into IRSAs in certain instances may be implied from a govern-
mental unit's express power to enter into contracts, in conjunction
with a general power to do whatever is necessary or convenient to
carry out the governmental unit's purposes.319
The Metropolitan Transportation Authority, as noted earlier, does
not have express statutory authority to enter into IRSAs. 32 0 Never-
theless, it would appear that, under its existing powers, the MTA
could execute an IRSA in certain instances in furtherance of its ex-
press purposes. Pursuant to the New York Public Authorities Law,
the MTA has the power "[t]o enter into contracts and leases and to
execute all instruments necessary or convenient."'32' The MTA also
has the power "[t]o borrow money and issue negotiable notes, bonds
or other obligations, ' '322 as well as the power "[t]o do all things neces-
sary, convenient or desirable to carry out its purposes and for the ex-
ercise of" its express powers.323 Based on the foregoing express
315. McGavin, supra note 9, at 220-21.
316. Id. at 221.
317. Polk County Bd. of Supervisors v. Polk Commonwealth Charter Comm'n, 522
N.W.2d 783, 790-91 (Iowa 1994) (citing Merriam v. Moody's Executors, 25 Iowa 163,
170 (1868), and Gritton v. City of Des Moines, 73 N.W.2d 813, 815 (Iowa 1955)). The
"Dillon Rule" provides that municipal entities can only possess and exercise powers
that are "expressly granted by the legislature," necessary, "fairly implied" or inciden-
tal to express powers, and those that are "indispensably essential-not merely conve-
nient-to the declared objects and purposes of the municipality." Id. See also 3
Sutherland, Stat. Const., § 64.02, at 260-62 (5th ed. 1992) (discussing limitations on
municipalities' powers); 2 McQuillin, Mun. Corp., § 10.21, at 1057 (3d ed. 1988) (dis-
cussing rules of construction with respect to the powers of municipal corporations).
318. Civil Serv. Forum v. New York City Transit Auth., 163 N.Y.S.2d 476, 483 (App.
Div. 1957), aff'd 4 N.Y.2d 866 (1958) (quoting People ex rel. City of Olean v. Western
New York & Pennsylvania Traction Co., 214 N.Y. 526, 529 (1915)).
319. See McGavin, supra note 9 at 221.
320. See supra notes 242-46 and accompanying text.
321. N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 1265(6) (McKinney 1982).
322. Id. § 1265(3).
323. Idt § 1265(14).
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powers, the MTA may have the implied power to enter into IRSAs in
particular cases.
On the other hand, a general rule of statutory construction provides
that a legislative body is presumptively aware of existing statutes in-
volving similar matters.314 Thus, when the New York State Legisla-
ture created the New York Local Government Assistance
Corporation in 1990 and expressly authorized it to engage in IR-
SAs,3  the Legislature, presumably, was aware that other governmen-
tal units in New York State did not have this express power.
Arguably, had the Legislature wanted the MTA or other governmen-
tal units to have the authority to enter into IRSAs, it would have
amended the appropriate statutes to effect this intent.
In some states, municipalities' "home rule" power may further sup-
port a conclusion that such municipalities have the power to enter into
IRSAs.31 Home rule powers generally authorize local municipalities
to act subject only to express statutory limitations on their author-
ity.327 In Texas, for example, courts have consistently held that munic-
ipalities with home rule powers need not look to legislative grants of
authority to exercise powers; rather, they need only determine that no
legislative limitation exists on their constitutional powers.32s Thus,
where municipalities have broad home rule powers in addition to the
power to contract, manage their finances and do all things necessary
or convenient in the furtherance of their express powers, these munic-
ipalities arguably also have the authority to enter into IRSAs under
certain circumstances.
Yet, absent express statutory authority, there may still be disagree-
ments as to whether a governmental entity may legally enter into IR-
SAs. The City of New York, for example, has entered into IRSAs
although it lacks express authority, and some market participants have
questioned the city's authority to enter into these types of transac-
324. See, e.g., Colonial Springs Club v. Westchester County, 840 F. Supp. 19, 20
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (in resolving a dispute over whether a statute referring to those who
"'own residential property"' (quoting Part 6-1 of the New York State Sanitary Code
effective Oct. 7, 1992) could be read to exclude "renters," noted that the difference in
terms was meaningful and that "[clourts generally assume that rule-making and legis-
lative bodies are 'knowledgeable about existing law pertinent' to the subject." Id.
(quoting Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 184-85 (1988))).
325. N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 3235(17) (McKinney 1995).
326. McGavin, supra note 9, at 222-23.
327. "In contrast to a general-law city, a home-rule city has authority to do
whatever is not specifically prohibited by the State." City of Lockhart v. United
States, 460 U.S. 125, 127 (1983).
328. McGavin, supra note 9, at 223 & n.11 (citing State v. City of La Porte, 386
S.W.2d 782,785 (Tex. 1965); Royal Crest, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 520 S.W.2d 858,
865 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); cf. Chemical Bank v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys.,
666 P.2d 329, 340 (Wash. 1983) ("In some states, the home rule powers of municipali-
ties result in considerable autonomy from state control In Washington, the courts
have interpreted home rule powers of first class cities more narrowly.")).
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tions. 9 This type of ambiguity makes the market inefficient330 be-
cause each IRSA must be analyzed under the laws of the applicable
jurisdiction.33 '
Still other undesirable consequences flow from uncertain authority
to enter into IRSAs, such as "the distortion of competition in the mar-
ket, the creation of uncertainty in the market generally as to whether
transactions entered into in good faith will be upheld, etc."' 332 Fur-
thermore, even if a governmental unit's reliance on other express
grants of power to enter into IRSAs survives an ultra vires challenge,
this ambiguity does nothing to ensure that a governmental unit's use
of IRSAs or other investment tools is prudent and undertaken only to
improve debt and asset management or reduce costs. Most states' ex-
isting legislation was not designed to deal with these relatively modem
and complex financial transactions and is unlikely to contain the type
of oversight and guidelines necessary to ensure that IRSAs are not
misused.
B. Express Statutory Authorization
While many governmental units, in reliance upon their existing stat-
utory powers, have entered into IRSAs without legal challenge to
date, a growing number of states have given governmental units
within their jurisdictions express authorization to enter into IRSAs.333
Great variety exists, however, in the scope of and limitations on ex-
isting express authority.
329. Sean Monsarrat, Munis Tumble, Hit by Supply; New York City Priced at
Z15%, Bond Buyer, Oct. 21, 1992, at 1, 30. In October of 1992, "market players
questioned how the city could execute a swap without expressed legal authority" even
though the city's bond counsel had issued an opinion that the city had the power to
enter into the particular IRSA. Id. The transaction, involving a $50 million indexed
inverse floater, included an IRSA. Id. at 30. An indexed inverse floater is a variable
rate security that moves "inversely to market interest rates and [is] pegged to an in-
dex." Id. Indexed inverse floaters expose issuers to a variable-rate liability. Id. IR-
SAs are typically used in conjunction with this product to offset their variable rate
risk. Id. The city's bond counsel issued an opinion that the city is legally authorized to
execute this particular transaction because the city is expressly authorized to "execute
contracts that facilitate the issuance of variable-rate debt." Id. Yet, bond counsel also
stated that this does not mean that the city can legally execute IRSAs generally. Id.
Some of the participants in the transaction hesitated to even call the transaction an
IRSA, referring to it instead as a "'bond issuance accommodation agreement.'" Id.
The city stated that the transaction would save half a million dollars over the term of
the bonds. Id.
330. See, e.g., Das, supra note 46, at 70 ("An efficient market by definition is one in
which prices are set at levels whereby the resources traded in the market are allocated
equitably or efficiently among the participants." Id. This economic theory requires
"satisfaction of a wide range of conditions." Id. Among the necessary conditions are
the participants in the market agree on the implications of various information and its
effect on the value of the resources being traded. Id.)
331. See Canby, supra note 66, at 421-22.
332. Id.
333. McGavin, supra note 9, at 223.
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Some states have given very broad express authority to virtually all
governmental units within their jurisdictions. 31 In California, for ex-
ample, every governmental entity in the state has express statutory
authority to enter into IRSAs, as well as various other types of deriva-
tives, in connection with new or existing bond issues, purchasing or
holding investments or in connection with any investment program.335
Similarly, in Florida, any governmental unit that issues taxable bonds
may enter into IRSAs and other types of derivatives.336 In Nevada, in
contrast, only a municipality that has issued or plans to issue securities
in the amount of $10 million or more may enter into IRSAs if such
agreements are "in the best interests of the municipality. ' 337 Nevada
also requires, among other things, that the IRSA counterparty be
highly rated by a "nationally recognized rating agency," and either
guarantee the IRSA or put up 100% of the IRSA's notional value as
collateral at the time the agreement is made.31 The New York Legis-
lature has granted only one governmental unit express authority to
enter into IRSAs. The New York Local Government Assistance Cor-
poration may "enter into interest rate exchange or similar arrange-
ments with any person under such terms and conditions as the
corporation may determine. 339 The power of the New York State
Thruway Authority to enter into IRSAs, while not express, is inferred
from its obligation to report annually to the state comptroller and
budget director its expenses, including fees paid to "providers of inter-
est rate exchange agreements."'
In Utah, all public treasurers are expressly authorized to enter into
IRSAs provided that their governing board or the issuing authority
makes a determination that entering into IRSAs is "necessary, conve-
nient, or appropriate for the control or management of debt or for the
cost of servicing debt."3'1 Unlike many other states, however, Utah
334. See, e.g., supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text (discussing California's leg-
islation granting virtually all governmental units in California express authority to
engage in IRSAs and other derivative products).
335. See supra note 31.
336. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 159.823(5) (West 1990) sets forth the governmental units that
are authorized to enter into IRSAs and other types of derivative products. These
include
the state, any department, board, commission, or other agency of the state,
or any county, municipality, special district, or other political subdivision of
the state, heretofore or hereafter created, or any board, commission, author-
ity, or other public agency or instrumentality which is now or hereafter au-
thorized by law to issue bonds.
Id.
337. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 350.820(1) (1994) (permitting only those municipalities that
have "issued or propose[ ] to issue municipal securities in the amount of $10,000,000"
to enter into IRSAs).
338. Id § 350.820(2).
339. N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 3235(17) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
340. N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 380(2)(d) (McKinney 1994).
341. Utah Code Ann. § 51-7-17(2)(b)(i) (1994).
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has provided, together with this express statutory authority, clear stat-
utory342 and regulatory343 guidance for public treasurers and oversight
bodies. Utah's regulatory guidelines include limitations on the pur-
poses for which IRSAs may be used,3 " criteria concerning the quality
of IRSA counterparties' 5 and requirements concerning semi-annual
reporting on outstanding IRSAs. 6 Utah also imposes criminal penal-
ties upon "[a]ny public entity that wilfully violates" regulations gov-
erning IRSAs or that "knowingly makes or causes to be made a false
statement or report to the [Utah money management] council." 3 7
While statutes expressly authorizing governmental units to enter
into IRSAs vary widely, many share a common omission-a lack of a
comprehensive program providing for guidelines, oversight and con-
trol of governmental units' use of IRSAs. Even Utah's statutes and
regulations, while going much further than most states' statutes in pro-
viding necessary guidelines and reporting requirements for public fi-
nance officials, fall short of guidelines and procedures generally
recommended in this industry. For example, Utah does not appear to
require public treasurers to mark IRSAs to market, a procedure that
industry participants regard as fundamental to managing a portfolio
containing derivatives. 34
C. Benefits of Express Statutory Authority
Under certain circumstances, entering into an IRSA may be the
most fiscally prudent action a governmental unit can take. Why, then,
would state legislatures fail to enact legislation expressly permitting
certain governmental units to enter into IRSAs? Some observers sug-
gest that when regulators have difficulty understanding the risks in-
volved in derivative transactions, they cannot be expected to draft
342. Id. § 51-7-3, 51-7-18.
343. Utah Admin. R. 614, 614-18 (1995) ("Money Management Council Adminis-
tration" and "Conditions and Procedures for Use of Interest Rate Contracts").
344. Id. at R. 614-18-4 (The governmental unit's governing board can only approve
an IRSA if it "is designed to reduce the amount or duration of payment, rate, spread
or similar risk, or... is reasonably anticipated to result in a lower cost of borrowing."
Furthermore, the regulation specifically provides that IRSAs can only be used "for
the control or management of debt or the cost of servicing debt and not for
speculation.").
345. Id. at R. 614-18-5 (requiring that a counterparty be rated "in one of the hih-
est three rating categories by at least two Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations as defined in [the regulations]").
346. Id. at R. 614-18-8(1) (requiring public treasurers to report to the Utah Money
Management Council a listing of all outstanding contracts, their notional value, "the
underlying debt to which each [c]ontract relates," the type of contract and a descrip-
tion of the governmental unit's payment obligations under each contract).
347. Id. at R. 614-18-8(2), (3).
348. Group of Thirty, supra note 15, at 9 (recommending that derivatives dealers,
for risk management purposes, should "mark their derivatives positions to market"
daily).
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effective regulations. 49 While understanding the risks and benefits of
IRSAs may be difficult, legislators have an obligation to the public to
educate themselves on this subject.
States should enact legislation expressly permitting certain govern-
mental units within their jurisdictions to enter into IRSAs and estab-
lish adequate systems of oversight and control for three primary
reasons. First, express authorization will eliminate the risk that a gov-
ernmental unit could be found to have acted ultra vires of its statutory
authority by entering into an IRSA. This, in turn, will enhance the
attractiveness of governmental units as swap counterparties, enabling
them to obtain a better execution price for swaps and improving the
efficiency of the market.35
Second, express authorization, together with appropriate oversight
and controls, may encourage more government financial managers to
become knowledgeable in the way IRSAs work and to investigate
whether the prudent use of IRSAs may benefit their jurisdictions.351
In addition, those governmental units that already possess the exper-
tise and resources to execute and manage IRSAs properly can begin
to use this investment tool, secure in the knowledge that their actions,
procedures and investment strategies are clearly sanctioned by their
legislatures. Governmental units will be able to use this tool, when
appropriate, to hedge against risks associated with interest-rate vola-
tility, thereby helping to eliminate the implicit "gamble" that may be
in their existing portfolios. They also will be able to assist more ac-
tively other governmental units and local officials in understanding
this product and in developing guidelines for other governmental
units' financial programs.
Third, by establishing and enforcing a clear and comprehensive sys-
tem of oversight and controls, state legislatures will significantly mini-
mize the danger that public funds will be needlessly lost due to
operational risk-the risk of losses resulting from "inadequate sys-
tems and control, human error, or management failure."'3 2
D. Recommendations
To avoid or minimize risks and increased costs, state legislative
leaders, like their counterparts in the private sector, must ensure that
"[flinancial decisions... [are] monitored more closely from the very
349. Hu, supra note 5, at 1463.
350. See, e.g., Bashawaty, supra note 23, at 10, 12 (arguing that the derivatives mar-
ket should become more standardized, thereby increasing activity in and access to this
market for a larger number of dealers and users and providing a widening range of
products).
351. See supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
352. Group of Thirty, supra note 15, at 50.
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top of organizations." '353 The recommendations in this part offer the
elements of a statutory framework wherein IRSAs can be used
responsibly and in concert with clearly stated legislative objectives.
These recommendations are intentionally general in nature so that
they can be modified to apply to different types of governmental units
in different jurisdictions. Modifications, of course, will be appropriate
in certain circumstances, and some existing statutes already contain
elements of these recommendations. Furthermore, these recommen-
dations are not intended to impede governmental units or to impose
excessive regulations. Rather, they are intended to ensure that gov-
ernmental units' use of IRSAs is prudent. As governmental units' use
of IRSAs increases and financial managers' knowledge and sophistica-
tion about IRSAs and their applications expand, some of these re-
quirements may be appropriately reduced or eliminated.
1. Only Large Governmental Units Should be Authorized to Enter
into IRSAs
State legislators should assess the governmental entities in their ju-
risdictions and clearly distinguish, by dollar volume of debt outstand-
ing, between those entities that should be authorized to enter into
IRSAs and those that should not. Not every one of the nation's
50,000 state and local governmental entities should be authorized to
enter into IRSAs. Many of these governmental entities do not issue
debt or issue relatively small amounts of debt infrequently. State leg-
islators should ensure that those governmental units that have little or
no need to use IRSAs are expressly prohibited from entering into IR-
SAs. Conversely, there are many larger governmental entities that is-
sue significant amounts of debt on a regular basis, managing billions
of dollars in assets. Such governmental units could benefit from en-
tering into IRSAs and should be expressly authorized to do so.
2. Legislative and Regulatory Bodies Should Approve
Governmental Units' IRSA Guidelines
The governing body of each governmental entity expressly author-
ized to enter into IRSAs should develop guidelines that must be sub-
mitted to designated state legislative and regulatory bodies for
approval prior to the entity's use of IRSAs. The guidelines should
clearly set forth in detail the governmental unit's purposes and objec-
tives for the use of IRSAs. The guidelines should include, but not be
limited to, the following:
a. standards and procedures for the qualification of IRSA
counterparties and standards for determining the financial
353. Using Derivatives: What Senior Managers Must Know, Harvard Bus. Rev.,
Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 33.
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benefit to be obtained through the use of such agreements.
Such standards should address the following:
(1) the form of IRSA contracts;
(2) interest rate exposure;
(3) credit ratings of counterparties;
(4) collateralization;
(5) exposure limits;
(6) the index or indices used to determine the value of
the IRSAs;
(7) capitalization of counterparties;
(8) the procurement process to be used; and
(9) the terms for whether IRSAs should be negotiated
or competitively bid;
b. requirements that IRSAs be in writing and contain provisions
covering payments, security, default and remedies;
c. requirements for periodic internal and independent audits of
governmental units' IRSAs;
d. adoption of standards that demonstrate that governmental
units utilize managers and financial professionals with appro-
priate expertise and technical resources in the development
and negotiation of IRSAs;
e. limitations on the amount of IRSAs, in terms of notional
value, and on the relationship of such amounts to outstanding
indebtedness;
f. provisions addressing the roll-over risk and the risk of early
termination of IRSAs and provisions for mitigating the govern-
mental entity's exposure thereto;
g. provisions for reporting on IRSAs; and
h. provisions for notice to legislative and regulatory bodies of the
proposed authorization of an IRSA, including the proposed
terms and conditions thereof.
3. Responsibilities of Governing Boards of Governmental Units
Each IRSA to be entered into by a governmental unit should be
authorized in advance by its governing body based upon a written
analysis and determination of the following:
a. the necessity or appropriateness of such contract and that the
proposed IRSA complies with the governmental entity's
guidelines;
b. the benefits expected to be realized through the use of the IRSA
and that such expectation is reasonable;
c. the risks presented by the use of the IRSA and the measures to
be taken to manage such risks; and
d. that the use of the IRSA is related to the present or future issu-
ance or carrying of its bonds, notes or other obligations or the
acquisition or carrying of a program of investment and is not be-
ing entered into for speculative purposes.
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4. Human Resources, Systems, Monitoring and Reporting
Requirements
Each governmental unit expressly authorized to enter into IRSAs
should demonstrate to its governing, legislative and regulatory bodies
that its IRSAs are structured and monitored by well-trained, responsi-
ble persons and that it has adequate resources and systems for moni-
toring its IRSAs. Each governmental entity should mark its IRSAs to
market daily and file at least quarterly with its governing, legislative
and regulatory bodies a report regarding the use, status and actual
performance of each IRSA relative to its goals.
5. Internal and Independent Audits, Accounting and Disclosure
Practices
Each governmental entity expressly authorized to enter into IRSAs
should report annually to its governing, legislative and regulatory bod-
ies its practices and procedures for internally auditing its IRSAs for
compliance with the governmental entity's guidelines, how and when
independent audits are conducted and its accounting procedures, as
well as disclosure practices applicable to IRSAs. These governmental
entities should develop principles relating to the disclosure standards
applicable to IRSAs in connection with their debt offerings and finan-
cial reports and statements. Furthermore, such governmental entities
should provide the results of each audit, internal and independent, to
their governing, legislative and regulatory bodies.
CONCLUSION
Much of the states' existing legislation governing financial activities
of governmental units is in need of revision to reflect current financial
developments and economic realities. Even many of the relatively re-
cently enacted statutes expressly authorizing governmental units to
enter into IRSAs do not adequately address operational risks that can
result from largely unsupervised, unmonitored IRSA activities. State
legislatures must meet their responsibility of safeguarding the public
fisc by educating themselves in the use of IRSAs, enacting legislation
expressly authorizing governmental units to enter into IRSAs and
monitoring their use of IRSAs. Until legislatures take these actions,
many of the nation's state and local governmental units will continue
to operate-significantly less efficiently than necessary or desirable-
in search of statutory authority to enter into IRSAs.
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